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Mars: An Overview of Title I of the Americans With Disabilities Act and

AN OVERVIEW OF TITLE I OF THE
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT AND ITS
IMPACT UPON FEDERAL
LABOR LAW
Harvey S. Mars*

INTRODUCTION

Heralded as one of the most important pieces of civil rights
legislation since the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Americans With
Disabilities Act ("ADA") was signed into law by President Bush on
July 26, 1990.' The law, which consists of four sections, aims to
eliminate discrimination against disabled individuals in the areas of
employment (Title I), social services (Title D), public accommodations
offered by private entities (Title I) and telecommunications (Title
IV). Despite the ADA's profound and far-reaching impact, it was
passed by both houses of Congress in a relatively short period of
time with little public debate or controversy 3

* Member New York and District of Columbia Bars. BA., Oberlin College; J.D.,
Albany Law School of Union University; M.S.I.L.R. Cornell University/Baruch College. Mr.
Mars is an associate attorney with Gleason & Mathews, P.C., a law firm specializing in labor
and employment law located in New York, NY. The author wishes to thank David Frey,
Esq., Paul Hugel, Esq., Ann Berezowski, Linda Perez, Debbie Kubic and Judith Kronenberg
for their invaluable assistance preparing this article.
1. Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp. V 1993)).
2. See S. REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1989) [hereinafter S. REP. No. 116]
("The purpose of the ADA is to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate to end
discrimination against individuals with disabilities and to bring persons with disabilities into
.
economic and social mainstream of American life ...
3. The ADA was introduced to the Senate on May 9, 1989, and to the House of Representatives on May 13, 1989. 136 CONG. REc. 59,686 (daily ed. July 13, 1990). It was
unanimously approved by the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources the same
year it was introduced. Id. The alacrity with which this legislation passed both houses of
Congress should be contrasted with the length of time it took the legislature to pass the
North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA"), Pub. L. No. 103-182, 107 Stat. 2057
(1993), the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 ("Crime Bill"), Pub. L.
No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796, or the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 ("FMLA"), Pub.
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However, the lack of public debate may not be as beneficial to
the disabled as one might think. In many respects, the public remains

ignorant of the ramifications and scope of this statute. Public debate
such as that surrounding Professor Anita Hill's sexual harassment
allegations against Clarence Thomas would probably serve to further
sensitize the public to the particular issues involving employment
discrimination and the handicapped. 4

This article is divided into four sections. The first section provides a brief overview of the requirements of ADA Title I through a
review of statutory definitions, legislative history and Equal Employ-

ment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") guidelines, as well as recent
case law interpreting the Act. In addition, the first section addresses
the ADA's predecessor statute, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. The
second section explores the tension between the demands of the TaftHartley Ac and the ADA's reasonable accommodation requirement.
Section three comments on employees' welfare benefit entitlements
and the ADA's non-discrimination mandate The fourth and final
portion addresses alternative dispute resolution methods, arbitration,
and employment discrimination claims under the ADA.
The goal of this article is to explore three areas where Title I of
the ADA potentially conflicts with established precepts of federal
labor law.9 In so doing, I hope to shed more light on the specific

L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6, legislation which can hardly be considered as progressive as the
ADA.
4. As the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources noted, recognition of the
deeply hidden issues concerning discrimination and the handicapped requires a particularly
high level of sensitivity:
Discrimination results from actions or inactions that discriminate by effect as well
as by intent or design. Discrimination also includes harms resulting from the construction of transportation, architectural, and communication barriers and the adoption or application of standards and criteria and practices and procedures based on
thoughtlessness or indifference - of benign neglect.
S. REP. No. 116, supra note 2, at 6.
5. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 357 (current version at 29
U.S.C. §§ 701-794 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
6. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, 1947, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (current
version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
7. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (Supp. V 1993).
8. See id. § 12101(b)(1).
9. It has been recently determined that the concept of federal preemption does not
apply to the ADA. See Anderson v. Martin Brower Co., No. 93-2333, 1994 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 10682 (D. Kan. July 22, 1994). Hence, there is no tension between the ADA and
state law. Many states, such as New York, have anti-discrimination laws which protect the
handicapped. These statutes now supplement the protection accorded by the ADA. See, e.g.,
N.Y. HuMAN RIGHTs LAW § 296 (McKinney 1993); N.Y. CrrY ADMIN. CODE & CHARTER
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obligations created by the ADA so that Title I's ultimate goal, the
excise of employment discrimination against the handicapped,"0 can
be more readily accomplished. Additionally, I intend to point out
those unsettled aspects of the law which necessitate a remedial judicial or legislative response. Finally, I will propose practical solutions
to those problematic areas which would allow for the harmonization
of the ADA's requirements with the demands of federal common law
decisions and other labor statutes.
PART I
THE ADA, TITLE I: SCOPE AND COVERAGE

The main provision within Title I prohibiting employment discrimination against handicapped individuals is in section 12112(a) of
the ADA, which provides that:
No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual
with a disability ... in regard to job application procedures, the
hiring, advancement or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training and other terms, conditions, and privileges of

employment."
Under section 12111(2), the "covered entities" which must comply
with the ADA include private employers, state and local governments,
unions, and jointly-administered labor-management committees. 2
The definition of employer under the ADA was meant to be
consistent with the definition of employer contained within Title VII
tit. 8, ch. 1 (1994).
Furthermore, the ADA specifically provides that the Act shall not be "construed to
invalidate or limit the remedies, rights, and procedures of any Federal law or law of any
State or political subdivision of any State or jurisdiction that provides greater or equal protection for the rights of individuals with disabilities than are afforded by this chapter." 42
U.S.C. § 12201(b) (Supp. V 1993). Thus, it clearly was the intent of Congress that the ADA
would enhance, rather than replace, already existent state and federal law.
10. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (Supp. V 1993).
11. Id. § 12112(a).
12.

See EEOC TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL ON THE EMPLOYMENT PROVISIONS (TI-

TLE I) OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILTIE Act I-1 (1992) [hereinafter EEOC MANUAL].
Prior to July 26, 1994, only employers with 25 or more full time employees were covered
by the ADA. Subsequent to July 26, 1994, the threshold was lowered to employers with 15
or more full time employees. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A) (Supp. V 1993). The EEOC Manual
provides that the threshold number of employees includes "part-time employees, working for
[a covered entity] for 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year."
EEOC MANUAL, supra, at I-1.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1995

3

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 12, Iss. 2 [1995], Art. 3
Hofstra Labor Law Journal

[V/ol. 12:2

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.'" Accordingly, the ADA embraces
persons who are agents of an employer as well as "any party who
significantly affects access of any individual to employment opportunities, regardless of whether that party may technically be described
as an employer of an aggrieved individual as that term has generally
been defined at common law."' 4 The definition of employer under
the ADA is so broad that it has even been held to apply to multiemployer trust funds which simply provide employee benefits to
employees pursuant to the terms of a collective bargaining agree5
ment.

Title I of the ADA protects only "qualified individual[s] with a
disability."'" In order for an individual with a disability to be considered qualified, he must demonstrate that he is able, with or without
a reasonable accommodation, to perform the essential functions of the
job he seeks or currently holds. 7 Under the ADA, if an individual
fails to satisfy the requisite skill, experience, education, or other job

related requirements of a particular position, he or she may not be
considered qualified for that position and, therefore, may not be entitled to statutory protection. 8 Furthermore, an individual seeking relief under the ADA must show that, despite a handicap, he is capable
of performing the essential functions of the employment position he
either seeks or holds. 9 The statute, however, provides little guidance
as to how an employer is to determine what the essential functions of

a position are.' Despite this fact, it seems quite clear that a handi13. See S. REP. No. 116, supra note 2, at 25. As in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act,
the ADA provides that corporations fully owned by the U.S. Government or Indian tribes,
and bona fide private clubs which are exempt from taxation under the Internal Revenue Code
(and which are not labor organizations), are exempt from coverage. These entities are not
defmed as employers under either statute. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(B) (Supp. V 1993).
14. Spirt v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n, 691 F.2d 1054, 1063 (2d Cir. 1982).
15. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 3, Mason Tenders Dist. Council Welfare Fund v.
Donaghey, 93 Civ. 1154 (S. Dist. Rep.) (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 19, 1993) (Transcript of plaintiff's
oral argument on motion for summary judgment, Nov. 19, 1993); see also Memorandum
Decision on Plaintiffs' and Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, EEOC v. Monroe
Foods, Inc., 93 Civ. 2925 (D. Md. May 16, 1994).
16. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (Supp. V 1993).
17. Id.
18. EEOC MANUAL, supra note 12, at 1-11.
19. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (Supp. V 1993).
20. Id. Section 12111(8) provides that
"[flor the purposes of this subchapter, consideration shall be given to the employer's judgment as to what functions of a job are essential, and if an employer has
prepared a written description before advertising or interviewing applicants for the
job, this description shall be considered evidence of the essential functions of the
job"
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capped person may not be denied an employment opportunity simply
because he or she is incapable of performing non-essential or margin-

al aspects of a specific job.!2 '

To qualify for protection under the ADA, an individual must be
considered disabled. The definition of "disability" under the ADA is
incredibly broad. It includes:
(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or
more of the major life activities of the individual;
(B) a prior record of such an impairment; or
(C) being regarded as having such an impairment.'
It is interesting to note that under section 12102(2)(c), even if an
individual is simply believed to have a disability, that individual is
entitled to protection under the ADA whether or not he or she actually has the perceived disability.'a Employers, therefore, must behave
cautiously before glibly labeling an employee "handicapped"; to do so

may raise the specter of statutory rights (and their co-requisite obligations) which the employee might not have originally had but for the

employer's mistaken perception.
Under the first prong of section 12102(2), a physical impairment
Id. (emphasis added). Thus, it would seem best for an employer to prepare a comprehensive
written job description outlining the essential functions of a position before seeking applicants
for that position. This would give the employer a quantifiable and objective basis for determining whether a handicapped individual can indeed be considered "qualified."
21. EEOC MANUAL, supra note 12, at 11-12.
22. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (Supp. V 1993). The ADA's definition of disability tracks the
definition of "person with a handicap" contained within the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. See
29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(a) (1988); see also 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(A) (Supp. V 1993) (altering the
statute's original terminology by referring to an "individual with a disability"). Thus, practitioners who commence actions under ADA Title I will have the benefit of interpretative
case law under the Rehabilitation Act to establish which afflictions are considered disabilities.
Recently, the EEOC promulgated new guidelines defining the term "disability" under the
ADA. While the guidelines do not change the conception of what are qualified disabilities,
they provide a greater depth to this term and add concrete examples of covered disabilities.
See EEOC Compliance Manual Directive No. 915.002, § 902 (Mar. 14, 1995).
23. The Senate Committee, when it considered the rationale behind § 12102(2)(c), noted
that this section was based upon the Supreme Court's decision in School Bd. of Nassau
County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987), a case decided under the Rehabilitation Act. See S.
REP. No. 116, supra note 2, at 24. In Arline, the Court wrote:
By amending the definition of "handicapped individual" to include not only those
who are actually physically impaired but also those who are regarded as impaired
and who, as a result, are substantially limited in a major life activity, Congress
acknowledged that society's accumulated myths and fears about disability and diseases are as handicapping as are the physical limitations that flow from actual
impairment.
Arline, 480 U.S. at 284.
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is considered to be:
any physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or
anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following body systems: neurological; musculoskeletal; special sense organs; respiratory
including speech organs; cardiovascular; reproductive; digestive;
gastro-urinary; hemic and lymphatic; skin; and endocrine. 24
A mental disorder is defined as "any mental or psychological disor-

der, such as mental retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional or

'
mental illness, and specific learning disabilities."as
Because the

ADA's definition of mental

and physical impairment is so generic,

it is almost impossible to develop a specific list of covered ailments.
Apparently, Congress intended to keep the definition of disability
fluid so that individuals with diseases which become pervasive at a
future date (as did AIDS beginning fifteen years ago) may also be
entitled to protection.'
Since the ADA's legislative history largely parallels the Rehabili-

tation Act,

one may assume that the specific handicaps covered by

the Rehabilitation Act are also covered by the ADA. 29 Additional
ailments potentially covered under the ADA include: obesity;3 stress
and job related depression where a psychological basis is estab-

24. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(i) (1989); see 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (Supp. V 1993).
25. See EEOC MANUAL, supra note 12, at H-2.
26. The Senate, when it considered the parameters of "mental impairment," noted that
the ADA, with some limited exceptions, covered the gamut of mental illnesses listed within
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders used by psychiatric and mental
health professionals, just as the Rehabilitation Act did. See 135 CONG. REC. Sl1,173, S11,174
(daily ed. Sept. 14, 1989). The ADA's coverage of mental disabilities pose interesting questions for both employer and employee alike. See Louis Pechman, Mental Disabilities in the
Workplace, N.Y. Li., Mar. 2, 1994, at 1.
27. See 54 Fed. Reg. 3245 (1989); Chai R. Feldblum, The Americans with Disabilities
Act Definition of Disability, 7 LAB. LAW. 11, 20 (1991).
28. See S. REP. No. 116, supra note 2, at 21.
29. For example, vision and hearing impairments; emotional disturbance and mental illness; seizure disorders; orthopedic and neuromotor disabilities; speech impairments; learning
disabilities; cancer, IV; and infectious and cystic fibrosis, among others, are considered
protected conditions under both the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA. See Robert L. Burgdorf
Jr., The American With DisabilitiesAct: A Practicaland Legal Guide to Impact, Enforcement
and Compliance, BNA Special Report (1990) at 82-83.
30. See Cook v. Rhode Island Dep't of Mental Health, 783 F. Supp. 1569 (D.R.I. 1992),
affd, 10 F.3d 17 (1st Cir. 1993); Cassista v. Community Foods, Inc., 856 P.2d 1143 (Cal.
1993).
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lished;31 and full-blown AIDS.32
Furthermore, the ADA specifically excludes current alcohol and
illegal drug users from its definition of "qualified individual[s] with a
' However, individuals are not excluded from coverage if
disability."33
they are recovering drug abusers or alcoholics who have either previously been or are currently enrolled in a supervised drug rehabilitation program.34 In this respect, a significant distinction between the
ADA and the Rehabilitation Act exists. While an alcoholic is absolutely protected by the Rehabilitation Act,35 under the ADA an individual must prove that he has recovered and actually able to adequately perform all of the essential functions of his position.36
The ADA specifically removes from its scope individuals with
such alleged "disorders" as homosexuality, transsexualism, sexual
behavior disorders, compulsive gambling, kleptomania or pyromania.37 This limitation on the ADA's scope was apparently added as a
compromise to an even more exclusive amendment which would have
permitted discriminatory actions against disabled individuals if such
conduct were the product of the discriminator's religious or moral
convictions.3 8 A compromise was achieved because the provision, as
originally suggested, would have rendered the protection afforded by
the ADA nugatory.
The ADA does, however, protect one type of individual not
otherwise covered by the Rehabilitation Act because it prohibits discrimination against qualified employees and job applicants who do not
have a disability, but who associate with a disabled individual covered by the Act.39 Thus, an employer may not discriminate against
an employee or a job applicant whose wife has Alzheimer's disease
or whose life partner has AIDS without running afoul of the ADA.'

31.
794 (2d
32.
33.

See Guice-Mills v. Derwinski, 772 F. Supp. 188 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), affid, 967 F.2d
Cir. 1992).
See Phelps v. Field Real Estate Co., 991 F.2d 645 (10th Cir. 1993).
42 U.S.C. § 12114(a) (Supp. V 1993).

34. See id. § 12114(b).
35. See 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
36. See 42 U.S.C. § 12114(c)(4) (Supp. V 1993).
37. Id § 12211. In contrast, the Rehabilitation Act does not mention any of these disorders. See 29 U.S.C. § 706(13) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
38. See Feldblum, supra note 27, at 25.
39. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(4) (Supp. V 1993). Section 12112(b)(4) defines this form of
prohibited discrimination to mean "excluding or otherwise denying equal job benefits to a
qualified individual because of the known disability of an individual with whom the qualified
individual is known to have a relationship or association." Id.
40. See Chai R. Feldblum, The Americans with DisabilitiesAct Definition of Disability, 7
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There is no provision comparable to this in the Rehabilitation Act. Of
course, since such an employee is not otherwise covered by the ADA,
this individual would have to prove that he or she was in fact discriminated against solely due to his or her relationship with a disabled individual.41 In practice, this form of discrimination may be
extremely difficult to prove.
As mentioned previously, in order for a disabled individual to be
entitled to ADA protection under section 12111(8), he must demonstrate that he is capable of performing the essential functions of his
position.42 Hence, even if an employee has a disability specifically
covered by the ADA, he is unable to take advantage of the ADA's
provisions if he is incapable of performing the essential functions of
his job. For example, a limousine driver who suffers from frequent
anxiety attacks which substantially inhibit his ability to drive would
most likely not be a qualified person under the ADA.
Finally, a disabled individual must be able to demonstrate that
the effect of his disability substantially limits his ability to perform
what is categorized as a "major life activity."" The ADA's regulations provide a three pronged inquiry to determine whether a disability has created a substantial impairment of an individual's major life
activity: (1) the nature and severity of the impairment; (2) the expected duration of the impairment; and (3) its permanent long-term or
expected impact.4' Hence, the ADA is not meant to immunize individuals with a trivial impairment (e.g., infected finger or mild allergies) from disability-based employment discrimination.' Nevertheless, because of the possibility that a diabetic may lapse into a coma
without insulin, a person who simply requires regular injections of
insulin would be considered substantially impaired since his insulindependent condition inhibits the manner in which he is able to perform several major life activities.47
LAB. LAW. 11, 25-26 (1991). Although Congress originally attempted to limit the statute's

concept of "association with a covered disabled individual" to those individuals related by
blood, marriage, adoption or judicial decree, the actual terms of the ADA were not limited in
that fashion. Id. at 25.
41. See id.
42. See supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text.
43. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (Supp. V 1993).
44. Id. § 12102(2)(A); EEOC MANUAL, supra note 12, at 11-3; S. REP. No. 116, supra
note 2, at 23 (noting examples such as walling, speaking, seeing, hearing, breathing, learning
and working).
45. EEOC MANUAL, supra note 12, app. B § 1630.20) at B-9.
46. S. REP. No. 116, supra note 2, at 23.
47. EEOC MANUAL, supra note 12, at B-10.
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A. Reasonable Accommodation
Title I of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act are unique among
civil rights legislation in that both acts place dual obligations upon
employers. First, the statutes require that employers not discriminate
against a qualified disabled employee or prospective employee who
can perform the essential functions of an available employment position." Additionally, both mandate that an employer provide reasonable accommodation to an otherwise qualified employee who is not
capable of performing necessary employment functions without that
accommodation.4 9
For example, an otherwise qualified visually impaired individual
may be entitled to a device that enhances visual images, if such a
device would enable that individual to satisfactorily perform essential
functions of his or her job." In fact, the ADA specifically provides
that a covered entity would engage in discriminatory behavior by
failing to reasonably accommodate an individual who is capable of
performing the essential job functions once they are aided by such a
reasonable accommodation.5 '
The exact nature of the reasonable accommodation required in a
particular situation is not elaborated on in the ADA. Nonetheless, the
ADA provides some guidelines as to the general types of reasonable
accommodations that an employer might provide to qualified employees.52 Section 12111(9) provides that the term "reasonable accommodation" may include:
(A) making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible
to and usable by individuals with disabilities; and
(B) job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or modification of equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or modifications of examinations, training materials or policies, the provision of qualified
readers or interpreters, and other similar accommodations for indi-

48. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (Supp. V 1993); 29 C.F.R. § 794 (1988).
49. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111 (Supp. V 1993); 29 C.F.R. § 1613.703 (1994).
50. As will be discussed in Part II of this article, infra, the reasonable accommodation
provision of the ADA potentially comes into conflict in several respects with an employer's
statutory obligation to negotiate in good faith over the terms and conditions of employment.
51. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (Supp. V 1993).

52. See id. § 12111(9).
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viduals with disabilities. 3
This definition, of course, is by no means meant to be exhaustive. It
certainly can be anticipated that innumerable possible accommodations
may be available to address the many possible afflictions covered by
the statute.
Once again, consideration of the Rehabilitation Act would be
instructive to anyone attempting to ascertain the scope of the ADA's
reasonable accommodation requirement, since the Rehabilitation Act
also contains reasonable accommodation provisions. 4 Nevertheless,
while the ADA was under consideration, the legislature recognized
that "the decision as to what reasonable accommodation is appropriate
is one which must be determined based on the particular facts of the
' Ultimately, a review of the particular accommodaindividual case."55
tions found permissible or necessary under the Rehabilitation Act
' was utiwould reveal that a "fact-specific case-by-case approach"56
lized by employers and the courts in assessing the accommodation's
propriety.
Besides including suggested parameters for developing reasonable
accommodations within the statute, the legislature also included in the
ADA's legislative history several examples of how specific disabilities
might be reasonably accommodated to provide employers with additional guidance. 7 For instance, the ADA's legislative history suggests that shift rotation might be appropriate for disabled individuals,
such as those who suffer from epilepsy, who are incapable of working a standard work schedule. 8 A person who has impaired mobility
and who is reliant on public transportation that is not fully accessible
might also require a modified work schedule. 9 Of course, blind or
visually impaired individuals require specific computer software or
hardware to accommodate their disability.' Similarly, the hearing
impaired may require telephone handset amplifiers, telephones which
are compatible with hearing aids and/or special telecommunications
devices.6' Individuals with impaired physical dexterity may require

53. Id
54.
55.
Cong.,
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

See 29 U.S.C. §§
See S. REP. No.
1st Sess., pt. 2, at
S. REP. No. 116,
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 32.
Id.

791, 794 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
116, supra note 2, at 31; see also H.R. REP. NO. 485, 101st
62 (1990) [hereinafter H.R. REP. No. 485].
101st Cong., 1st Sess. 31 (1989).
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other types of mechanical devices, such as a mechanical page turner,
raised or lowered office furniture, or telephone headsets.62 Finally,
part-time or modified work schedules may be required for people
with chronic disabilities which require regularly scheduled medical
attention and treatment. 63 It must be stressed, however, that the Act's
legislative history makes it clear that the ADA "does not entitle an
individual with a disability to more paid leave time than non-disabled
employees."
In order for an employee or job applicant to become entitled to
reasonable accommodation, he must first specifically request accommodation from his employer since the ADA only requires that reasonable accommodation be made to the known physical or mental
limitations of an otherwise qualified individual.' In fact, the legislative history of the Act indicates that it is patently improper for an
employer to unilaterally impose an accommodation upon a handicapped employee since this might actually have an adverse effect
upon him or her. 66
This prohibition could potentially cause a dilemma for an employer who recognizes that a qualified employee's job performance is,
or has become, impaired because of a disability. If the impaired employee has either failed or refused to request an accommodation the
employer may not act unilaterally. One commentator has suggested
that this problem may not be a critical one since "the general problem-solving tenor of the ADA suggests that employers should be
proactive in generating dialogue regarding [employees'] apparent
needs for accommodation."'67 This prediction, however, awaits empirical verification.
The ADA makes it clear that an employer is not required to
reasonably accommodate every disabled employee or job applicant
who seeks employment. An employer may reject or even dismiss a
disabled employee who is rendered unqualified or unable to perform
the essential functions of his job, even if he were reasonably accommodated. 6' For instance, a person whose handicap prohibits him from
obtaining a driver's license, such as a person who suffers from un62. Id.
63. Id. at 31.
64. Id.
65. See EEOC MANUAL, supra note 12, at 111-7; S. REP. No. 116, supra note 56, at 34.
66. See S. REP. No. 116, supra note 56, at 34.
67. C. Geoffrey Weirich, Reasonable Accommodation Under the Americans With Disabilities Act, 7 LAB. LAW. 27, 32 (1991).
68. Id. at 28.
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controllable grand mal seizures, can be rejected from employment as
a city bus driver because driving is an essential element of this job,
an element which he or she is incapable of performing. Even with a
reasonable accommodation this individual would still be incapable of
driving. Another example might be a teacher who suffers from cerebral palsy but who has failed to obtain the requisite specialized license for the teaching position he or she seeks. No reasonable accommodation is possible here since the teacher lacks the necessary qualifications to perform the position sought.
B. Undue Hardship
Where it can be proved that the requested reasonable accommodation would cause "undue hardship" to the employer's business, the
employer is provided with a specific statutory defense to a discrimination claim under the ADA.69 This is true even if the handicapped
individual could perform the essential functions of his or her job with
the aid of an accommodation. In this respect, the ADA provides that
a reasonable accommodation is required unless "such covered entity
can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue
hardship on the operation of the business of such covered entity.

.

*. ,70

Undue hardship is defined under the ADA as a significant expense or considerable difficulty in implementation of reasonable accommodations. 71 The ADA lists several factors to be considered by
an employer in determining whether or not a reasonable accommodation could be considered unduly burdensome.' These factors include
the nature of the accommodation sought, the financial resources of the
employer who is requested to provide the accommodation, the effect
of the accommodation upon the functioning and operation of the
covered entity, the size of the operation, the number of the employees
at the facility where the accommodation is proposed to be implemented and the type of operation involved.' Hence, if the fundamental

69. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (Supp. V 1993).
70. Id.
71. Id. § 12111(10)(A).
72. Id. § 12111(10)(B)(i)-(iv).
73. See Russell H. Gardner & Carolyn I. Campanella, The Undue Hardship Defense to
the Reasonable Accommodation Requirement of the Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990,
7 LAB. LAW. 37, 38 (1991). As with the list of factors to be considered in determining the
existence of a disability and possible reasonable accommodations under the ADA, the parameters set forth by the Act for establishing that a particular reasonable accommodation would be
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processes by which the employer operates would be completely
changed by a proposed accommodation, or if its cost would be exces-

sive, the employer would not violate the ADA by refusing to implement 4 it since the accommodation could not be considered reason7
able.
As with the ADA's reasonable accommodation requirement, the
undue hardship defense had its genesis in the Rehabilitation Act.75

One might assume that a review of the legal decisions under the
Rehabilitation Act would be of assistance to anyone seeking to obtain

a better understanding of the ADA's undue hardship concept. Unfortunately, this is not the case. While there is a wealth of Rehabilitation
Act case law dealing with the undue hardship defense, it is unclear if
these cases concern the issue of whether the accommodation is unreasonable or whether it is unduly burdensome. 6 Clear parameters do
not exist and courts have often used these concepts interchangeably.
This distinction is critical since under the Rehabilitation Act (and

most likely the ADA) the unduly burdensome concept is an affirmative defense to a discrimination action.77 On the other hand, a determination of whether an accommodation is reasonable is part of the
prima facie case under both acts. 7' Thus, the reasonableness of the

unduly burdensome were not meant to be exhaustive. These guidelines were merely meant to
provide guidance to employers concerning the nature of their obligation to reasonably accommodate a disabled employee. Id.
74. See Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the Americans
with Disabilities Act, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(3) (1994).
75. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 794, 794(c) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). To a lesser extent, the concept of undue hardship under the ADA is analogous to the concept of undue hardship found
in a section of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, providing that an employer is required to reasonably accommodate an employee's religious beliefs and practices unless the employer is
able to demonstrate that such an accommodation would cause undue hardship to the
employer's business. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e() (1988 & Supp. V 1993). The legislative history of the ADA makes it clear, however, that the de minimis requirement for religious accommodation first formulated in TWA v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977), does not apply to reasonable accommodation as defined by the ADA. S. REP. No. 116, supra note 56, at 36. The
Senate noted that in Hardison the Supreme Court held that "an employer need not accommodate persons with religious beliefs if the accommodation would require more than a de minimis cost for the employer." S. REP. No. 116, supra note 56, at 36. Under the ADA, much
more must be shown in order to establish the undue hardship defense.
76. See Gardner & Campanella, supra note 73, at 38-39.
77. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). As with any discrimination action, the plaintiff must first prove that a legally sufficient prima faie discrimination
claim exists. Only after a prima faie case has been put forth by the plaintiff is the defendant required to demonstrate that the accommodation requested would prove to be unduly
burdensome. Id. at 802.
78. 29 U.S.C. § 791 (1988 & Supp. V 1993); 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (Supp. V 1993).
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accommodation in the first instance must be shown by the plaintiff.
The major distinction between the concepts of reasonable accommodation and undue hardship is, therefore, who has the ultimate burden of
proof on the issue.79
That the courts have occasionally confused these concepts is
amply demonstrated in several appellate level decisions. For example,
in Pushkin v. Regents of University of Colorado," the Tenth Circuit
held that the defendant had the burden of proving that an employee's
disability could not be reasonably accommodated (rather than the
employee proving that she could be reasonably accommodated as part
of her prima facie case). 8 The Ninth Circuit has held that when presenting evidence to demonstrate an accommodation is unreasonable,
the burden rests on the employer to show:
sufficient information from the [disabled employee or] applicant and
from qualified experts as needed to determine what accommodations
are necessary to enable the [employee or] applicant to perform the
job safely. The application of this standard requires a strong factual
foundation in order to establish that an applicant's handicap precludes safe employment. After marshaling the facts, the employer
must make a decision as to the reasonableness of the accommodation.'
Furthermore, in Prewitt v. United States Postal Service,83 the Fifth
Circuit held that "the burden of proving inability to accommodate is
upon the employer" because:
[t]he employer has a greater knowledge of the essentials of the
job than does the handicapped applicant. The employer can look
at its own experience, or, if that is not helpful, to that of other
employers who have provided jobs to individuals with handicaps
similar to those of the applicant in question.84

79. As in many areas of litigation, the outcome of a discrimination action may often be
predicted by ascertaining which party ultimately bears the burden of proof. See, e.g., Saint
Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993).
80. 658 F.2d 1372 (10th Cir. 1981).
81. Id. at 1387 ("defendants have the burden of going forward and proving that plaintiff
is not . . . one who is able to meet all of the program's requirements in spite of his handicap") (emphasis in original).
82. Mantolete v. Bolger, 767 F.2d 1416, 1423 (9th Cir. 1985) (emphasis in original).
83. 662 F.2d 292 (Former 5th Cir. Unit A Nov. 1981).
84. Id. at 308; cf. Doe v. New York Univ., 666 F.2d 761, 776-77 (2d Cir. 1981) (holding that the employer's burden of proof is solely limited to proof of undue hardship). The
decision in Doe appears more in line with the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA's intended
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It remains to be seen whether case law interpreting the ADA will
clarify whether it is the employer or the employee who bears the
ultimate burden of proof on this issue. This should not be a difficult
decision, since the statute indicates that the burden of showing that an
accommodation would pose an undue hardship rests upon the employ85

er.

The most important factor used to consider whether an accommodation poses an undue hardship upon an employer is its cost. If an
accommodation would potentially bankrupt the employer, it is clear
that a disabled employee may not insist upon it. For this reason, a
large employer with greater financial resources would be expected to
provide more costly accommodations than an employer whose resources were not as great.
Cost is not the only factor considered. If the accommodation
requested would disrupt the employer's ability to prepare work schedules, such as where a disabled employee desires to take unlimited
leave without complying with employer's notice policy, undue hardship may be also demonstrated. 6 If the accommodation would be
dangerous to the disabled employee or other employees in the plant,
it also may be prohibited. This is so even though the ADA does not
specifically list safety as a relevant considerationY
Under the Rehabilitation Act, courts have held that an employer
is not required to modify an existing job or create a new job category
simply to accommodate a handicapped employee." Nor is an employer required to modify job requirements to eliminate a specific
essential element which a disabled employee is unable to perform. 9
Additionally, employers are not required to hire an additional employee to help a disabled person perform a position for which only one
employee was originally intended.'
Finally, the ADA's legislative history provides that even if an
accommodation may be considered too burdensome for an employer
to implement, if the disabled employee is capable of either providing

distribution of burdens between plaintiff and defendant.
85. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(b)(5)(A), 12113(a) (Supp V. 1993); Schmidt v. Safeway
Inc., 864 F. Supp. 991 (D. Or. 1994).

86. See Kimbro v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 889 F.2d 869 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
498 U.S. 814 (1990) (decided under Washington handicap anti-discrimination law which has
objectives similar to those of the ADA).
87.. See 42 U.S.C. § 12213(b) (Supp. V 1993).
88. See Fowler v. Frank, 702 F. Supp. 143 (E.D. Mich. 1988).
89. See Jasany v. United States Postal Serv., 755 F.2d 1244 (6th Cir. 1985).

90. See Arneson v. Heckler, 879 F.2d 393, 397-98 (8th Cir. 1989).
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the accommodation on his own or eliminating the burdensome part of
it, he may not be denied employment if the sole reason for the denial
would have been the hardship caused by the accommodation.9 ' The
EEOC Technical Assistance Manual also lists other examples where
an employer may not refuse to provide a reasonable accommodation
which is allegedly unduly burdensome.'
PART II

THE ADA's EFFECT UPON LABOR-MANAGEMENT COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING OBLIGATIONS

In addition to prohibiting private employers from discriminating
against qualified handicapped or disabled individuals with respect to
available employment opportunities, the ADA provides that employers
must reasonably accommodate disabled employees who are capable of
performing the essential functions of their job or a job sought, unless
the employer establishes that such accommodation would create an
undue hardship.93 Also, the ADA specifically provides that employers
may consider job reassignment as an available reasonable accommoda94
tion.
Nonetheless, if an employment situation is covered by a collective bargaining agreement, job reassignment may only be available to
a disabled employee if the agreement's terms are complied with or if
good faith negotiations occur between the parties to the agreement. In
this respect, the ADA potentially comes into direct conflict with labor
and management's obligations under the Taft-Hartley Act.95 The
ADA has created a statutory obligation to reasonably accommodate
disabled employees which is independent of, and potentially contrary
to, labor and management's collective bargaining obligations.'

91. S. REP. No. 116, supra note 56, at 37.
92. See EEOC MANUAL, supra note 12, at 111-12 to MI-16.
93. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (Supp. V 1993). The ADA requires reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of a qualified applicant as a
means of overcoming unnecessary barriers that prevent or restrict employment opportunities
for otherwise qualified individuals with disabilities, unless an employer can show that the
accommodations would impose an undue hardship on the business. See id.
94. Itd. § 12111(9)(B).
95. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
96. See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1988). The declaration of policy for the Taft-Hartley Act
provides that:
It is declared hereby to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes
of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate
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Hence, the ADA varies from several other progressive federal statutes
such as the Fair Labor Standards Act,97 the Equal Pay Act s and
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,99 since these statutes simply define the minimum statutory entitlements which collective bargaining agreements may not abrogate.
A. Basic Analysis
Before the terms and conditions of employment can be unilaterally modified by an employer, the Taft-Hartley Act requires that

good faith collective bargaining must occur between an employee
representative and the employer who has exclusively recognized that

representative. This is true only if wages, hours or other mandatory
bargaining items are concerned."
Additionally, the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement
may not be changed without the explicit consent of both parties to
the agreement."' The ADA, however, requires covered employers to
make reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental
limitations of otherwise qualified employees or applicants for employ-

ment, unless it can be proven that such an accommodation would
impose an undue hardship upon the employer."
In order to effectuate an accommodation, the ADA might be
interpreted to require an employer to unilaterally modify the terms

and conditions of a handicapped employee's position without first
and eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred by encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or protection.
Id.; see also id. § 157. Section 157 sets forth the rights of employees as to organization and
collective bargaining, specifically providing that
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining . . . and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of
such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an
agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in section 158(a)(3) of this title.
Id.
97. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
98. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1988).
99. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
100. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5), 158(b) (1988).
101. Id. § 158(d).
102. 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (Supp. V 1993).
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consulting the employees' exclusive bargaining representative."'
Such a unilateral change in employment conditions may subject the
employer to unfair labor practice charges.'O° An unfair labor practice
charge may also be filed, or a breach of contract action initiated,'
if the employer, by implementing an accommodation, fails to honor
the provisions of a written collective bargaining agreement.
For example, an accommodation may involve shifting a handicapped employee to "lighter work" duties in violation of an established seniority rights provision within the collective bargaining agreement. This could result in the filing of a National Labor Relations
Board ("NLRB") charge by the union or the employees whose seniority were ignored. On the other hand, if the employer failed to
provide such an accommodation, it may be subjected to a claim before the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") under
the ADA. Under these circumstances, a Catch-22 conflict between the
Taft-Hartley Act and the ADA is most probable.
B. Analysis in Line with the Rehabilitation Act of 1973
The reasonable accommodation requirement in the ADA is also
contained within its predecessor statute, the Rehabilitation Act of
1973.1' An examination of the Rehabilitation Act and relevant interpretative case law provides insight into the possible harmonization of
the ADA with the Taft-Hartley Act.
Similar to the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act was promulgated by
Congress in order to provide greater job training and employment
opportunities for handicapped individuals."° Its primary focus was
on increasing federal economic aid and providing vocational rehabili-

103. If the employer negotiates a reasonable accommodation with the handicapped individual directly rather than with the employee's certified bargaining representative, this may

also violate the Taft-Hartley Act's prohibition against direct negotiation between an employer
and an individual who is represented by a union which has been recognized as his exclusive
bargaining agent. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1988).
104. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 158 (a)(1), (a)(5) (1988).
105. Id. § 185.
106. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 357 (current version at 29
U.S.C. §§ 701-794 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)). As was previously discussed in Part I of this
article, supra, when Congress drafted the ADA it incorporated many standards of discrimination contained within the Rehabilitation Act, including an employer's responsibility to provide a reasonable accommodation. In fact, the EEOC interpretive guideline on Title I of the
ADA indicates that case law developed under the Rehabilitation Act should be considered
generally applicable to the ADA as well. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.1(c) (1994).
107. See 29 U.S.C. § 701 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
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tation for such individuals."'3 However, the Rehabilitation Act, including its anti-discrimination provision, only applies to employees of
the federal government or to employers who receive federal funding-" 9 It was not until the ADA was enacted that employment discrimination against handicapped individuals working in the private
sector, as well as for the state and local government, was actually
prohibited.
In reviewing the Rehabilitation Act, the federal courts have been
extremely reluctant to require a reasonable accommodation which
would abridge the rights of employees covered by a collective bargaining agreement. The Supreme Court has, nevertheless, held that the
Rehabilitation Act does in fact affirmatively require an employer to
reasonably accommodate an "otherwise qualified" employee with a
handicap."' In Arline, an employer was required to reassign a disabled employee (who was susceptible to tuberculosis) to an alternative
position which the employee was capable of performing if that employee was otherwise qualified."' The Supreme Court held that "although [employers] are not required to find another job for an employee who is not qualified for the job he or she was [originally]
doing, they cannot deny an employee alternative employment opportunities reasonably available under the employer's existing policies."". Nevertheless, under case law following the Arline decision,
it appears that reasonable accommodations which contravene the terms
of a collective bargaining agreement will be prohibited under the
3
Rehabilitation Act."
In Daubert v. United States Postal Service,"4 a disabled employee requested that the responsibilities of her job as a postal worker
be altered so that she would only be required to perform "light duties."".5 Under the seniority provisions of the collective bargaining

108. Id. §§ 720-752.
109. Id. §§ 791, 794.
110. See School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 285 (1987) (leaving open
the question of whether an alternative employment opportunity might be deemed inherently
unreasonable if it would violate the specific terms of a collective bargaining agreement).
111. See id. at 289.
112. Id. at 289 n.19.
113. See Shea v. Tisch, 870 F.2d 786 (1st Cir. 1989); Jasany v. United States Postal
Serv., 755 F.2d 1244 (6th Cir. 1985); Davis v. United States Postal Serv., 675 F. Supp. 225
(M.D. Pa. 1987); Hurst v. United States Postal Serv., 653 F. Supp. 259 (N.D. Ga. 1986);
Wimbley v. Bolger, 642 F. Supp. 481 (W.D. Tenn. 1986); Carty v. Carlin, 623 F. Supp.
1181 (D. Md. 1985).
114. 733 F.2d 1367 (10th Cir. 1984).
115. Id. at 1368. In Daubert, the plaintiff suffered from a degenerative spinal disease
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agreement covering Ms. Daubert, only employees with five years or
6
more experience were allowed to be transferred to light duty." Unfortunately, Ms. Daubert had only been employed with the Postal
Service for less than two years. "' The Postal Service terminated her
because she was no longer capable of handling the essential responsibilities of her position, rather than granting her request for an accommodation."'
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Daubert's claim
alleging a violation of the Rehabilitation Act, holding that compliance
with the terms of the Postal Service's national agreement was in fact9
a legitimate business reason justifying the plaintiff's discharge.' '
Furthermore, as Daubert could no longer perform the heavy lifting
required by her original position, she was no longer "otherwise qualified" to perform the essential functions of her job assignment.' It
can be reasoned that the circuit court viewed the employer's obligations under its collective bargaining agreement as superior to the
reasonable accommodation requirement of the Rehabilitation Act.
The Fourth Circuit came to the same conclusion in Carter v.
Tisch.' In Carter, an employee who had developed asthma - and
was no longer capable of performing his regular duties as a custodian
- sought a permanent light duty custodial position." The plaintiffs employer refused to permit him to engage in light duty work
since he had failed to meet the prerequisite seniority requirements
under the applicable collective bargaining agreement." The court
agreed with the employer's position and held that its obligation to
provide a disabled employee with a reasonable accommodation does
not override the provisions of a valid collective bargaining agreement
unless it could be conclusively demonstrated that the agreement's
primary objective was to discriminate against the disabled. 24 In this
respect, so long as the seniority provisions were bona fide, a handicapped employee did not have an actionable right under the Rehabilitation Act if an employer refused to reasonably accommodate him in

which prevented her from lifting heavy objects. Id. at 1369.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Id.
Id. at 1368-69.
Id. at 1369.
Id. at 1370.
Id. at 1372.
822 F.2d 465 (4th Cir. 1987).
Id. at 466.
Id.
Id. at 469.
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a manner which violated the agreement's seniority terms."z Since
the collective bargaining agreement's seniority provision was determined to be bona fide in Carter, the circuit court affirmed the dismissal of the complaint." Thus, although under the Rehabilitation
Act an employer has an affirmative obligation to effect a reasonable
accommodation, it may be concluded with some confidence that the
reasonable accommodation requirement is preempted where such accommodation comes into conflict with the established terms of a
collective bargaining agreement. Consequently, if case law under the
Rehabilitation Act is used as precedent for determinations under the
ADA, its "reasonable accommodation" provision would also be superseded by labor and management's Taft-Hartley bargaining obligations.
In order to determine whether Congress truly intended such preemption for the ADA, the Act's legislative history must be explored.
C. ADA's Legislative History
Portions of the ADA's legislative history seem to suggest that, as
with the Rehabilitation Act, the terms of a collective bargaining
agreement should be considered sacrosanct. Other portions of its
legislative history, however, indicate that - at least in some instances
- the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement might be subordinated to the important policy concerns of the ADA."
It should be noted that the legislative history of the ADA provides that case law and EEOC interpretive guidelines under the Rehabilitation Act are intended to be used as a guide for enforcing the
ADA. This is revealed in a portion of the ADA's legislative history
which states:
In the compromise bill, the applicable regulations [Rehabilitation
Act, section 504], 45 C.F.R. 84.12, has been incorporated almost
fully in the statute, to ensure the factors that have been used in
these and other section 504 cases continue to apply.... [I]n the
employment section, the ADA basically extends the provisions of

125.

Id. at 467. Thus, case law has established the Rehabilitation Act to be similar to

Title VII in that the provisions of a bona fide seniority plan are exempt from Title VIl's requirements. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)(2)(h) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). It may be anticipated
that the ADA will be interpreted as containing this exemption as well, even though its provi-

sions are silent on this matter.
126.
127.
128.

Carter, 822 F.2d at 467.
S. REP. No. 116, supra note 56, at 32.
S. REP. No. 116, supra note 56, at 32.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1995

21

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 12, Iss. 2 [1995], Art. 3
Hofstra Labor Law Journal

section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act to private entities ...

[V/ol. 12:2

Sec-

tion 504 is a very brief provision, which has been explicated by
regulations and case law over the past years. The sponsors of the
ADA wished to ...

create a clear and comprehensive statute that

would set forth all of the relevant non-discrimination provisions in
one place. The intent is still to track section 504 - but, at the
same time, to create a statute that can stand on its own and not be
dependent on incorporation by reference to regulations issued under
section 5042"
This portion of the ADA's legislative history supports the argument
that its reasonable accommodation requirement should yield to the
"more important" goals of the Taft-Hartley Act because this is what
30
case law established under the Rehabilitation Act.
Nevertheless, it also plainly indicates that the ADA has an existence independent from the Rehabilitation Act. In a discussion regarding the resolution of the conflicting demands of the Taft-Hartley Act
and the ADA, the Senate Report indicates that the duty of an employer to abide by ADA Title I should not be affected by any inconsistent term contained in a collective bargaining agreement to which it
is a party.13 ' Thus, according to this report, a covered entity would

not be permitted to use a collective bargaining agreement's terms as a
32
shield to allow it to do what the ADA would otherwise prohibit.
The House Report further indicates that although the terms of a
collective bargaining agreement may be considered when determining
whether or not an accommodation is reasonable, the agreement's
terms should not necessarily be conclusive. 3 3 The House Report
states:
An employer cannot use a collective bargaining agreement to accomplish what it otherwise would be prohibited from doing under
this [legislation]. For example, a collective bargaining agreement
that contained physical criteria which caused a disparate impact on
individuals with disabilities and were not job-related and consistent
with business necessity could be challenged under this [legislation].
...

The collective bargaining agreement could be relevant..,

in

determining whether a given accommodation is reasonable. For

129. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON EDUC. AND LAB., 101ST CONG., 2d SESS., REPORT ON
THE AMERIcANs wrrn DisABnmS AcT 2219 (Comm. Print 1990).
130. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
131. S. REP. No. 116, supra note 56, at 32.
132. S. REP. No. 116, supra note 56, at 32.
133. H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note 55, at 62.
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example, if a collective bargaining agreement reserves certain jobs

for employees with a given amount of seniority, it may be considered as a factor in determining whether it is a reasonable accommo-

dation to assign an employee with a disability without seniority to
the job. However, the agreement would not be determinative on the
134

issue.

Thus, the House Report also indicates that the seniority portion of a
collective bargaining agreement would not be solely determinative in
considering whether an accommodation which violates seniority
should be deemed unreasonable.'3 5
Ultimately, it appears that the legislature envisioned that the
inherent conflict between the Taft-Hartley Act and the ADA could be
averted by mutual negotiation between labor and management for
inclusion of a reasonable accommodation provision in their collective
bargaining agreements. 6 A recent commentator on the House ADA
Report, while noting the sensibility of the legislature's proposal, remarked:
A second period anticipated by Congress follows the expiration of
the old (pre-Act) agreement and begins with the negotiation of a

new agreement which would [contain a reasonable accommodation
provision]. With such a provision in place, the employer would face
no conflict and thus would have no need for reliance on a contrary
term in an agreement to avoid the duty to undertake reasonable

accommodation. The union also would have no need for reliance on
the provision to avoid reasonable accommodation because the term
was bargained for and, presumably, the union gained something in
return. The negotiation of an accommodation provision can be

thought of as the ideal, in that it permits both the employer and the
union to effectuate their responsibilities under the ADA without
undermining collective rights under the agreement. 37

134. H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note 55, at 62 (emphasis added).
135. H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note 55, at 62.
136. S. REP. No. 116, supra note 56, at 32.
137. Joanne J. Ervin, Reasonable Accommodation and the Collective BargainingAgreement
Under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 3 DEr. C.L. REv. 925, 966 (1991). Such
a provision in a collective bargaining agreement might be one which "allows an employer to
take all actions necessary to comply with this legislation." See S. REP. No. 116, supra note
56, at 32; H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note 55, at 63. The Senate Report provides that
"[c]onflicts between provisions of a collective bargaining agreement and an employer's duty
to provide a reasonable accommodation may be avoided by ensuring that agreements negotiated after the effective date of [the ADA] contain a provision permitting the employer to take
all actions necessary to comply with this legislation." S. REP. No. 116, supra note 56, at 32.
Such a clause might, however, justify an employer to ignore with impunity any of a collec-
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Whether reasonable accommodation clauses will actually be agreed to
between labor and management in order to address the concerns of
the Taft-Hartley Act and the ADA still remains to be seen.
D. Arbitration Decisions
Since the legislative history of the ADA is ambiguous, the ultimate resolution of the tension between the demands of the ADA and
the Taft-Hartley Act will be left to the judiciary. Because the ADA is
a relatively new statute, no trend is discernible from the reported
decisions.'
Several arbitration opinions, however, have taken the
requirements of the ADA into consideration and speculate as to how
this statute may be applied in practice." 9
A recent arbitration decision which considers the conflict between
the ADA and the Taft-Hartley Act is Waterous Co. v. International
Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers.' In the Waterous Company arbitration, the employee's grievance was based on his
employer's refusal to allow him to return to work after he had recovered from carpal tunnel syndrome and spinal surgery.'" After the
employee had recovered from his injuries, a qualified rehabilitation
consultant ("QRC") was retained to determine whether the employee
' 42
should return to full employment as a "Hydrant Assembler I'
The QRC determined that the employee was capable of returning to

tive bargaining agreement's provisions so long as it was done for the sake of providing a
disabled employee with a reasonable accommodation. It does not appear realistic to believe

that a union would actually make this large concession to promote the public policy advanced
by the ADA. Such a concession might even be violative of a union's duty of fair representation owed to its members.
138. See Emrick v. Libby-Owens-Ford Co., 875 F. Supp. 393, 395 (E.D. Tex. 1995)

(whether or not a collective bargaining agreement's bona fide seniority system can be ignored
in order to reasonably accommodate a handicapped employee depends upon the facts of the
case and is not dependant upon case law under the Rehabilitation Act); cf. Aldrich v.

Sullivan, 800 F. Supp. 1197, 1203 n.7 (D. Vt. 1992) (recognizing that the ADA may not
provide a judicial remedy which would require an employer to reassign a handicapped employee if such reassignment would contravene the terms of a collective bargaining agreement).
139. The utilization of arbitration awards to determine the practical application of the

ADA may not be sufficient for this purpose, however, since arbitrators historically have been
bound only by the requirements of the collective bargaining agreement under which the dispute is submitted and not by the requirements of external law. See, e.g., Stone Container
Corp., 101 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 943 (1993) (Feldman, Arb.).
140. 100 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 278 (1993) (Reynolds, Arb.).
141. Id. at 281.
142. Id.
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work, but could only perform limited elements of his prior job. 43
The employer refused to reinstate the employee, asserting that the
position required an employee who was able to perform all the duties
associated with the Hydrant Assembler II position."4 The arbitrator
ordered that the employee be reinstated and required that he be returned to work at a position consistent with the work restrictions
outlined by the QRC 45 The parties were directed to negotiate the
specific job functions that the employee would perform and the pay
he would receive." Finally, the arbitrator awarded the grievant full
back pay, seniority rights, and benefits. 47
This decision had its basis in two provisions contained within the
collective bargaining agreement at issue, which, in turn, had their
roots in the requirements of the ADA. The first provision, modeled
on the ADA directly, provided that there be no discrimination in the
administration of the agreement with regard to an employee's handicap."4 The effect of this clause was a direct prohibition on disparate
treatment of physically and mentally impaired employees.
The
second clause was a "modified" reasonable accommodation provision, 5 ° which mandated that the parties negotiate in regard to any
qualified employee who is or becomes handicapped and thus unable
to perform the work duties assigned to him or her in the usual man5
ner.1 1
Although the ADA was not mentioned by the arbitrator, it is
clear that this law had a pronounced effect upon the parties to the
collective bargaining agreement as demonstrated by the formulation of
the two contractual clauses in the agreement. The existence of these
clauses makes this decision noteworthy because they demonstrate a
possible means by which conflicting obligations under the TaftHartley Act and the ADA may be simultaneously satisfied. If the
contract had not contained these provisions, it would be fair to as-

143. Id.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
that it

Id. at 282.
Id. at 284.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 283.
Id.
Id. at 284. The reasonable accommodation provision was "modified" in the sense
only required the parties to negotiate over the terms of a possible reasonable accom-

modation. It did not authorize the employer to implement one unilaterally. See supra text accompanying notes 100-27.
151. Waterous Co., 100 Lab. Arb. Rep. at 284.
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sume that the decision might have been substantially different. The
arbitrator most likely would have considered only the existing terms
of the contract and not the ADA-modeled clauses.
Another noteworthy arbitration decision is Cleveland Electric
Illuminating Co. v. Utility Workers of America,5 2 which concerned a
mechanic who was discharged from employment after he sustained a
self-inflicted gunshot wound to his head.' Although he had substantially recovered from the gunshot wound, he sustained a permanent neurological injury which rendered him incapable of satisfying
his position's pole-climbing requirements.' 54 The employer discharged the mechanic after a summary investigation revealed that "no
reasonable accommodation could be made" to allow him to overcome
his physical limitations. 55
The collective bargaining agreement covering the terms and
conditions of the grievant's employment provided that "an employee
who is incapacitated for his regular work as a result of a [non-work
related compensable injury] shall be placed at any work he can
do."'56 Apparently the employer contended that because there was
no suitable work available for this employee, the only option it had
rather than allow him to remain in a position which clearly placed
him in danger - was to discharge him.'
In granting the grievant relief, the arbitrator in that case relied
upon both the terms of the collective bargaining agreement and the
requirements of the ADA. The arbitrator concluded that the employer
did not execute its position review with a good faith objective of
making an accommodation to the grievant since it had severely limited the positions actually considered available.'
Furthermore, the
arbitrator mandated that the employer engage in a good faith search
for a suitable position for the grievant and medically evaluate him
further to ascertain his current ability to handle available work as59
signments.
It should be noted that the arbitrator addressed the seniority issue
by explicitly stating that his decision was not meant to override or

152. 100 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1039 (1993) (Lipson, Arb.).
153. Id. at 1040.
154. Id. at 1041.
155. Id. The employer informed the employee that it attempted to place him in any job
he could perform, but that none were available at the time. Id. at 1040.
156. Id. at 1044.
157. Id. at 1043-44.
158. Id. at 1045.
159. Id.
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jeopardize the seniority rights of other employees.1" Though a true
good faith effort to reasonably accommodate the grievant was required by the award, it also made clear that the ultimate accommodation chosen could not be one which violated the parameters of the
collective bargaining agreement."'
More recent arbitration decisions provide an even clearer indication that, usually, the ADA's reasonable accommodation requirement
will not be permitted to override the written provisions of a collective
bargaining agreement, even when the requirements of the ADA are
actually considered by the arbitrator. In Stone Container Corp., 2
the grievants were several employees (and their union) who had their
shifts changed in order to accommodate an individual who suffered
from post-traumatic stress syndrome and depression.
Apparently,
the employer had permitted the disabled employee to work on a preferential shift as a reasonable accommodation, even though she did not
have the level of seniority required by the collective bargaining agreement to work this shift."6 Consequently, the grievants - who had
the requisite seniority - were removed from the preferential shift."
The arbitrator noted that if the ADA was not the law of the
land, the union and the grievant would obviously prevail." Nevertheless, he refused to consider the effect of the ADA upon the grievance because the collective bargaining agreement did not grant him
that prerogative. 67 The arbitrator wrote:
if the contract of collective bargaining allows the arbitrator to determine the answers of the grievance under the law of the land then
the contract needs to say so. In the instant matter, there is no clear
language placing before the arbitrator the right to determine the
answer to the grievance under the law of the land."6
The arbitrator, who ultimately granted the relief sought by the
grievants, did in fact discuss the terms of the ADA even though he
wrote that he was not permitted to consider the Act in reaching his
conclusion. First, it was held that there was insufficient evidence

160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

Id.
Id.
101 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 943 (1993) (Feldman, Arb.).
Id. at 944.
Id.
Id. at 945.
Id. at 946.
Id. at 947.
Id.
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presented at the arbitration to conclusively show that the employee
who was given the preferential shift was actually disabled. 9 Thus,
it was questionable whether she was actually a qualified employee
covered by the ADA. Next, it was determined that the accommodation granted to the allegedly disabled employee was not reasonable
since it operated to the substantial detriment of several of the employer's most senior employees. Hence, the arbitrator concluded that the
grievant had received "special treatment" totally unwarranted by the
ADA. 7 ' The arbitrator noted that even if the terms of the ADA
were considered, which was impermissible under the relevant collective bargaining agreement, the grievance would still have been grant17
ed. 1
The same result occurred in Clark County Sheriffs Department." This arbitration also dealt with a grievance filed by a union
which claimed that an employer had violated the seniority provisions
of its collective bargaining agreement by permitting a diabetic employee, who did not have the appropriate level of seniority, to work
on the employer's first shift." Apparently, the disabled employee
had been permitted to work the preferential shift as part of a settlement arranged between herself and her employer, which was entered
into without the consent of the union."
Rather than discussing the demands of the ADA, in granting the
grievance the arbitrator focused on the fact that the union was not a
party to the settlement agreement and had not been permitted to participate in the negotiation of its terms. 75 Such a unilateral change in
working conditions was held by the arbitrator to be violative of both
the collective bargaining agreement and the Taft-Hartley Act. 76 The
arbitrator noted, however, that had the employer and union negotiated
to impasse over the scope of a reasonable accommodation for this
employee, the employer would have then been permitted to implement
a unilateral change in the agreement."7

169. Id.
170. Id.
171.
172.
173.
174.

Id.
102 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 193 (1994) (Kindig, Arb.).
Id. at 194.
Id. at 194-95.

175.

Id. at 197.

176.
177.

Id.
Id. Also, had the collective bargaining agreement contained a provision explicitly

requiring negotiation over the terms of a disabled employee's reasonable accommodation, it
would have then been clear to the employer what its obligations were, and that a unilateral
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At least one arbitrator has come to an opposite conclusion when
presented with a reasonable accommodation which allegedly violated
a binding past-practice between the parties to a collective bargaining
agreement.' In Dearborn Heights, arbitration was utilized to determine if a modified shift accommodation, granted by an employer to
an employee who suffered from life threatening "brittle diabetes,"
violated a past practice between the parties to a collective bargaining
agreement.'7 9 This past practice, the existence of which was stipulated to at the arbitration, consisted of the employer assigning shifts
by seniority for three month durations.' The disabled employee, as
in the other arbitration cases cited, lacked sufficient seniority to warrant the shift he was ultimately granted by his employer as a reasonable accommodation. 8' However, unlike the other arbitration decisions, the arbitrator in DearbornHeights found that the grievance was
without merit and permitted the reasonable accommodation.'
Rather than denying that external law, such as the ADA, could
be considered without specific language in the agreement permitting
such reference, the arbitrator agreed with a minority position and
found that - in certain instances - an arbitrator could decide cases
based on sources external to the agreement.' Based on the ADA's
legislative history, the arbitrator determined that while the terms of a
collective bargaining agreement are relevant to whether an accommodation is reasonable, such terms are not strictly determinative of this
' The arbitrator held that, given the level of seniority of the
issue. "84
disabled employee and the fact that without the accommodation his

implementation of an accommodation was unacceptable. Id.
178. See City of Dearborn Heights, 101 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 809 (1993) (Kanner,

Arb.).
179. Id.
180.
181.
182.
violate

Id.
Id. at 810.
Id. at 816. It is significant to note that the accommodation at issue did not actually
the written -terms of the collective bargaining agreement since the agreement did not

actually contain a seniority provision. Seniority, however, was considered a controlling factor
in determining shift assignments because of the past acknowledged practice between the parties. Id. at 809-10. This past practice between the parties was deemed incorporated into the
collective bargaining agreement and found legally binding on the parties. However, even
though the accommodation violated the agreement's implicit terms, the employer's accommo-

dation was permitted. See id. at 810.
183. Id. at 811. This issue, whether arbitrators are bound strictly by the terms of a collective bargaining agreement or permitted to consider sources external to it when rendering
awards, is considered in depth in Part IV of this article, infra, which examines the ADA and

Arbitration.
184. Id. at 814; see also supra note 133 and accompanying text.
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life would be in jeopardy if he worked his previously assigned shift,
he was "persuaded that the collective bargaining agreement 'factor',
[sic] while of import, [was] not 'determinative' of the right of [the
disabled party] to a 'reasonable accommodation' under the ADA,"'' 5
i.e., the needs of the disabled employee outweighed the needs of the
grievants, who would be required to adjust their schedules to accommodate him.
This final arbitration award takes issue with the rather utilitarian
position adhered to by the majority of arbitrators - that the preservation of the bargaining unit's collective bargaining agreement outweighs the needs of a disabled individual to be reasonably accommodated. This was, however, by no means an unjustified award; there is
ample authority for it in the ADA's legislative history." 6 Nevertheless, it is the only arbitration award to date which took the position
that an accommodation may abrogate the terms of a collective bargaining agreement.
From these decisions, it is easy to conclude that an arbitrator
will often limit the scope of his inquiry to the exact terms of the
collective bargaining agreement at issue when dealing with either the
discharge, reinstatement or accommodation of a disabled employee.
The ADA will only be considered when it buttresses the actual provisions of the agreement. Moreover, when a proposed reasonable
accommodation conflicts with the unambiguous terms of a collective
bargaining agreement, the accommodation will usually not be permitted unless the agreement as a whole was actually meant to violate the
ADA or unless the need for the accommodation is so overwhelming
that abrogation of the agreement is justified.

E. Other Areas of Statutory Conflict: Direct Dealing and
Employees' Right to Privacy
Two related areas where the ADA also potentially conflicts with
the Taft-Hartley Act are (1) direct negotiation for an accommodation
between an employer and an employee represented by a union, and
(2) breach of the ADA's confidentiality requirement. Though not as
worrisome as the other conflicts elaborated in this article, these prob-

185.
186.

Dearborn Heights, 101 Lab. Arb. Rep. at 816.
See S. REP. No. 116, supra note 56, at 32.
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lems present some issues of interest to the practitioner.
Under sections 8(a)(5) and 9(a) of the Taft-Hartley Act, a certified union is the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of all
bargaining unit members." The ADA, however, requires that an
employer keep confidential all medical information acquired about a
disabled employee during either pre- or post-employment medical
examinations.' If an employer negotiates a reasonable accommodation with a represented employee without union intercession, the
employer may be violating Section 8(a)(5) of the Taft-Hartley
Act.'89 If the union is present while confidential information is being discussed, the employer may be violating the ADA if confidential
information is disclosed either by accident or intentionally.
Prior case law has demonstrated that a union's obligation to
negotiate in accordance with Section 8(a)(5) must be carefully balanced with an employee's right to privacy. For example, in Oil,
Chemical & Atomic Workers v. NLRB (Minnesota Mining),"9' the
court found that all medical information retained by an employer or
union must be redacted and/or kept sealed in order to protect an
employee's right to privacy. 9 ' Therefore, ample legal authority already exists to allow the reconciliation of this potential conflict. Under NLRB precedent, a union representative must be present while a
reasonable accommodation is negotiated with a handicapped employee."9 Because the ADA mandates that an employee's privacy rights
be adequately protected by all parties, reasonable steps must be taken
to ensure that privacy is maintained. This issue is not one that is
expected to create a great deal of case law. Any potential conflict is
resolved once the parties' respective obligations are recognized and
followed.

187. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5), 159(a) (1988).
188. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(1) (1994).
189. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1988) which provides:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer.., to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees, subject to the provisions of sec-

tion 159(a) of this title.
Id.
190. 711 F.2d 348 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
191. Id. at 363; see also Detroit Edison Co. v. NLRB, 440 U.S. 301 (1979) (holding that
an employee's interest in test secrecy justified the withholding of test-related information).
192. See, e.g., Waddell Eng'g Co., 305 N.L.R.B. 279, 281 (1991).
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PART IlI
EMPLOYEE WELFARE BENEFIT ENTITLEMENT AND THE AMERICANS

wrrH DisABmrrms ACT, TrrLE I
It is difficult to imagine a more publicized work-related issue
concerning contemporary employees than the maintenance and scope
of their employer-provided health insurance. 93 While the cost of
medical insurance continues to escalate, employees are either finding
their welfare benefits contracting as their insurance coverage is narrowed, or their paychecks are smaller as they are required to make
larger contributions to offset increased medical insurance costs. As the
acceptability of National Health Insurance legislation proposed by the
Clinton administration is no longer an issue before Congress, it seems
as though the nation's health insurance crisis may get even worse.
In the midst of this crisis, some commentators have argued that
Title I of the ADA has created a statutory basis through which employees can prohibit their employers from altering or decreasing
health benefits.'94 As discussed in Part I of this article, the ADA

prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of an employee or
job applicant's handicap. Proponents of the view that employers
should be prohibited from altering employee health benefits provided
due to a disability argue that any diminishment of employer-provided
health benefits would necessarily have an adverse effect upon disabled
employees and would presumptively violate the ADA. 95
Other legal commentators have taken the opposite view. They
claim that the ADA does not limit an employer's right to modify employee health insurance benefits and, furthermore, that the only provision which governs health plan modifications is the Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA")." The saliency of both views
193.

See George Rubin, Major Collective Bargaining Developments -

A Quarter Century

Review, Current Wage Developments 47 (Feb. 1974). In 1970, roughly 75% of employees in
both the public and private sectors were provided with some form of health insurance by
their employer. Today, this percentage is considerably higher. See 138 CONG. REC. S14,841,
S14,847 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 1992) ("Today more than 85 percent of employers provide health
insurance.") (statement of Sen. Craig).
194. See generally Lizzette Palmer, ERISA Preemption and Its Effects on Capping the
Health Benefits of Individuals with AIDS: A Demonstration of Why the United States Health
and Insurance Systems Require Substantial Reform, 30 HOUs. L. REv. 1347 (1993).
195. Id. at 1376-77.

196. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988 & Supp. V 1993); see Kimberly A. Ackourey, Insuring Americans with Disabilities: How Far Can Congress Go to Protect Traditional Practic-
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is currently being tested in pending litigation in district courts of both
New York and Maryland."9
A. ERISA and the Vesting of Employee Welfare Benefits (Prior to
the Rehabilitation & Americans With Disabilities Acts)

In 1974 Congress passed ERISA, a comprehensive statute which
established the legal framework through which employers may pro-

vide their employees with non-wage supplemental benefits such as a
pension and medical insurance.'
ERISA has three primary objectives: (1) to ensure vesting of retirement benefits; (2) to establish
strict fiduciary requirements for trustees of ERISA-covered employee
benefit plans; and (3) to require reporting, disclosure, termination

insurance, and specified funding requirements for employee benefit
plans in order to insure their fiscal integrity.'

In this respect,

ERISA was enacted by Congress as a remedial statute which was
intended to prevent previous employer misconduct which jeopardized

the fiscal viability of benefit plans.'

Prior to ERISA's enactment,

employers often found ways to withdraw employees' pension entitlements despite the accrual of a substantial amount of equity in their

plan.
ERISA covers employee benefit plans.
An employee benefit
plan, as defined by ERISA, may be either an employee welfare plan
or an employee pension plan.'e ERISA defines an employee welfare

es?, 40 EMORY LJ. 1183 (1991); Carl A. Greci, Use It and Lose It: The Employer's Absolute Right Under ERISA Section 510 to Engage in Post-Claim Modifications of Employee
Welfare Benefit Plans, 68 IND. LJ. 177 (1992).
197. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 3, Mason Tenders Dist. Council Welfare Fund v.
Donaghey, 93 Civ. 1154 (S. Dist. Rep.) (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 19, 1993) (Transcript of plaintiff's
oral argument on motion for summary judgment, Nov. 19, 1993) [hereinafter Donaghey];
Memorandum Decision on Plaintiffs' and Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, EEOC
v. Monroe Foods, Inc., 93 Civ. 2925 (D. Md. May 16, 1994) [hereinafter Monroe Foods].
198. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). It should be noted that
ERISA does not require that employers provide supplemental wage benefits to their employees. Benefits are monitored and regulated by ERISA only if an employer chooses to provide
them to its employees, and the benefit plans qualify as ERISA trust funds. Id. § 1001.
199. Id.
200. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b)(4) (1988).
201. See, e.g., Wilson v. Rudolph Wurlitzer Co., 194 N.E. 441, 442 (Ohio 1934) (even
though employee handbook promised a pension to employees who worked longer than twenty-five years, an employee who faithfully discharged his duties for over twenty-four years was
denied his pension entitlement because he had simply refused to work overtime on one occasion).
202. 29 U.S.C. § 1003 (1988).

203. Id. § 1002(3).
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plan as:
any plan, fund, or program... established or maintained by an
employer or by an employee organization, or by both, to the extent
that such plan, fund, or program was established or is maintained
for the purpose of providing for its participants or their beneficiaries, through the purchase of insurance or otherwise, (A) medical,
surgical, or hospital care or benefits, or benefits in the event of
sickness, accident, disability, death or unemployment, or vacation
benefits, apprenticeship or other training programs, or day care
centers, scholarship funds or pre-paid legal services, or (B) any
benefit described in section [302 (c) of the Labor Management
Relations Act, 1947] ... (other than pensions or retirement or
death, and insurance to provide such pensions)."'

Under this definition, health insurance provided by an employer to its
employees is an "employee welfare plan" and is subject to ERISA's

provisions.
While ERISA specifically prohibits the divestiture of retirement
benefits and contains minimum vesting standards for pensions, 05 it
does not contain comparable terms for employee welfare plans. Case

law clearly recognizes that an employer has an absolute right to modify health insurance to reduce benefits, or even terminate benefits
completely if its plan
the decision in Moore
of the first to establish
mandate the "vesting"
vided to employees."as

does not provide for vesting.2" For
v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.'
the fundamental principle that ERISA
of health benefits once such benefits

example,
was one
does not
are pro-

204. Id. § 1002(1).

205. 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
206. See, e.g., Owens v. Storehouse, Inc., 984 F.2d 394 (11th Cir. 1993); Moore v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 856 F.2d 488 (2d Cir. 1988). However, such modification or termination may not be implemented unilaterally when health benefits are provided to employees
under a collective bargaining agreement. See, e.g., Inland Tugs v. NLRB, 918 F.2d 1299 (7th
Cir. 1990). Recognizing that § 158(d) of the Taft-Hartley Act requires good faith bargaining
between labor and management over wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employment, id. at 1307, the court in Inland Tugs found health insurance trust funds to be a mandatory topic of bargaining included in the scope of labor and management's § 158(d) bargaining obligations. Id. at 1309.
207. 856 F.2d 488 (2d Cir. 1988).
208. Id. at 492. ERISA also contains a very broad preemption clause which, except in
limited instances, indicates that the statute supersedes all state laws relating to employee
benefit plans and which require plans to include specific benefits. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144
(1988 & Supp. V 1993); see also Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504 (1981)
(preemption found where state law relates to a qualified pension or welfare plan); NGS Am.,
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Prior to the enactment of the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA, to
prevent welfare insurance modifications an employee could only argue

that the change violated either ERISA's anti-discrimination provisions

or ERISA's fiduciary responsibility requirements. 2" A review of actions brought under sections 1104 and 1140 of ERISA reveals that
there is an almost insurmountable burden on a plaintiff to demonstrate
that a plan modification was violative of these sections.2"'

ERISA's fiduciary obligations provision2 ' requires a fiduciary

(the plan administrator or trustee) to discharge his duties, with respect

to a plan, solely in the interests of the plan's participants and/or
beneficiaries.2" 2 Some employees have initiated suits challenging limitations imposed upon their welfare benefits on the ground that the
fund's trustees had violated their fiduciary duty under ERISA by
imposing such limitations.2" 3
In Musto v. American General Corp.,2 4 several retirees brought
a class action suit against the administrator of their welfare fund

under ERISA in an attempt to block anticipated plan modifications
decreasing their post-retirement medical insurance."' The Sixth Cir-

cuit reversed a preliminary injunction granted by the trial court barring diminution of benefits, holding that ERISA's fiduciary standards
applied only to the administration of an employee benefit plan and
not to the determination of whether specific plan benefits should be

Inc. v. Barnes, 998 F.2d 296, 298 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that ERISA's pre-emption provision was enacted to provide uniformity in the administration of employee benefits and to
allow for the federalization of this area of law); cf. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 (1985) (holding that a Massachusetts statute mandating that employers
provide a minimum level of mental health benefits to their employees did not violate 29
U.S.C. § 1144 since the law only regulated insurance plans).
209. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1104, 1140 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
210. See, e.g., Turner v. Local 302, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 604 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir.
1979). In some pre-ERISA cases plaintiffs, rather than arguing that fiduciary duties had been
breached by a plan's modification or that the modification was discriminatory, argued that the
modification was a breach of a collective bargaining agreement under § 301 of the TaftHartley Act. However, so long as the plan's modification was accomplished through the process of collective bargaining and was not imposed unilaterally, such claims invariably failed.
See, e.g., McGann v. H & H Music Co., 946 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 482 (1992); Musto v. American Gen. Corp., 861 F.2d 897 (6th Cir. 1988).
211. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1114 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
212. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A)(i) (1988).
213. See, e.g., McGann v. H & H Music Co., 946 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 482 (1992); Musto v. American Gen. Corp., 861 F.2d 897 (6th Cir. 1988); Paul
v. Valley Truck Parts, Inc., No. 88-7131, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4554 (N.D. 111.Apr. 18,
1990).
214. 861 F.2d 897 (6th Cir. 1988).
215. Id. at 900.
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maintained. 216 Thus, the court held that since welfare benefits were
not vested, according to the welfare plan's terms, the trustees' prerogative to modify or terminate these benefits was not limited.2 7
The Fourth Circuit came to a similar conclusion in Sutton v.
2 8 Sutton
Wierton Steel Division.
involved an employer's decision to
terminate benefits for non-vested severance and contingent early retirement." 9 In deciding that the elimination of these benefits was
permissible and that ERISA's fiduciary standards were inapplicable to
prohibit it, the court held that:
Congress authorized an employer to administer its pension plan, and
in the discharge of its duties with respect to the plan, the employer
must satisfy the exacting fiduciary standards imposed by ERISA.
Congress, however, has not prohibited an employer who is also a
fiduciary from exercising the right accorded other employers to
renegotiate or amend, as the case may be, unfunded contingent
benefits payable before normal retirement age. The changes, accomplished in this manner, are not to be reviewed by fiduciary standards.m
More recently, the court in Paul v. Valley Truck Parts, Inc.2 1
went in the other direction, finding that a genuine issue of material
fact existed as to whether a trustee's retroactive amendment of an
employee profit-sharing plan violated ERISA's fiduciary standards. '
In this action, the court questioned whether previous employer contributions to the profit-sharing plan had actually vested for the benefit
of plan participants,' holding that if the benefits had vested the
trustee's diminution of those benefits might have breached their fiduciary responsibility under ERISA. ' 4 However, the Court's decision
in Paul is easily distinguishable from the decisions in Musto and
Sutton, since the latter two actions involved employee welfare benefits
which indisputably were not vested.
ERISA's anti-discrimination provision states that:

216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

Id.
Id. at 912.
724 F.2d 406 (4th Cir. 1983).
Id. at 409.
Id. at 410-11.
No. 88-7131, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4554 (N.D. Il. Apr. 18, 1990).
Id. at *15-16.
Id. at *13-14.
Id. at *17.
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It shall be unlawful for any person to discharge, fine, suspend,
expel, discipline, or discriminate against a participant or beneficiary
for exercising any right to which he is entitled under the provisions
of an employee benefit plan, this subchapter

.

. [section 3001] or

for the purpose of interfering with the attainment of any right to
which such participant may become entitled under [this] plan [o]r
subchapter, or the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act. It
shall be unlawful for any person to discharge, fine, suspend, expel,
or discriminate against any person because he has given information ... relating to this chapter.... 25

Some disabled employees have argued that a diminution or capping of the particular health benefits provided by their plan for treatment of their condition constitutes discrimination contrary to ERISA
Section 510.' A review of these decisions reveals that this argument has failed to gain a firm judicial foothold. The seminal case
involving Section 510 and its effect on employee health benefit entitlement is McGann v. H & H Music Co. 27 In McGann, the plaintiff, who had become infected with the AIDS virus, sued his employer for allegedly violating Section 510 of ERISA.' The claim was
premised on H & H Music's reducing the maximum benefits available to AIDS victims under its welfare plan from one million to five
thousand dollars. 9 Plaintiff McGann contended that the reduction of
his benefits was illegally motivated because it was implemented almost immediately after he had disclosed his medical condition to his
employer. 2
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of H & H
Music and, in dismissing McGann's complaint, held that an employer

225. 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (1988). This section (Section 510 of the original act) was enacted
by Congress "in the face of evidence that in some plans a worker's pension rights or the
expectations of those rights were interfered with by the use of economic sanctions or violent
reprisals." S. REP. No. 127, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 36 (1973). Although § 510 was enacted to
provide additional protection for plan participants and to prevent divestiture of an employee's
anticipated benefits, courts considering § 510 have rarely found that it has actually been violated.
226. See, e.g., Simmons v. Willcox, 911 F.2d 1077, 1081-82 (5th Cir. 1990); Clark v.
Resistoflex Co., 854 F.2d 762, 770 (5th Cir. 1988); see also Joan Vogel, Containing Medical
and Disability Costs by Cutting Unhealthy Employees: Does Section 510 of ERISA Provide a
Remedy?, 62 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 1024, 1025-27 (1987).
227. 946 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 482 (1992).
228. Id. at 403.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 405.
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has the absolute right to alter the terms of medical coverage to available plan beneficiaries."' The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district
court opinion and refused to reinstate McGann's suit. 2
The appellate court based its affirmance on McGann's failure to
satisfy the two fundamental components of a prima facie Section 510
suit: intentional discrimination against a plan beneficiary and a denial
of vested benefits.3 The court determined that dismissal of the
complaint was warranted since McGann had failed to prove that H &
H Music had specifically intended to discriminate against him."
Dismissal was also based upon McGann's failure to adduce any concrete evidence of his irrevocable entitlement to specific benefits under
the welfare plan."
In its analysis of the first Section 510 element - intentional
discrimination - the court found that ERISA conclusively establishes
that the plaintiff has the burden of proving that an employer specifically intended to interfere with or circumscribe his benefit entitlement,
holding that it is not enough to contend that the employer's actions
had a disparate impact upon the participant's welfare benefit entitlement. 6 Nor, the Fifth Circuit continued, was it enough merely to
show that discriminatory motivation was one among many factors
(mixed motive) that led to the employer's decision to eliminate benefits 3 7 Thus, McGann needed to demonstrate that the reduction was
meant to impair only his benefit entitlement3 8 McGann failed to
meet this criterion since the plan's reduction in AIDS benefits applied
equally to each and every one of H & H Music's employees. Even
though the court did find a connection between the employer's decision to modify its welfare plan and McGann's medical condition, it
held that:
Although we assume there was a connection between the benefits
reduction and either McGann's filing of claims or his revelations
about his illness, there is nothing in the record to suggest that

231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
Gavalik
(1987).
238.

Id. at 404.
Id. at 408.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 407-08.
Id. at 404.
Id.; see also Dister v. Continental Group, Inc., 859 F.2d 1108, 1112 (2d Cir. 1988);
v. Continental Can Co., 812 F.2d 834, 851 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 979
McGann, 946 F.2d at 404.
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defendants' motivation was other than as they asserted, namely to
no more for
avoid the expense of paying for AIDS treatment
who
beneficiary
plan
or
future
present
other
McGann than for any
might suffer from AIDS. McGann concedes that the reduction in
AIDS benefits will apply equally to all employees filing AIDS-related claims and that the effect of the reduction will not necessarily be
felt only by him. He fails to allege that the coverage reduction was
otherwise specifically intended to deny him particularly medical
coverage except "in effect." 39
Even if McGann had provided the requisite indicia that his
employer's AIDS benefits cap intentionally discriminated against him,
he still would have failed to allege a prima facie Section 510 suit
without producing evidence that he had a vested right to a specific
level of health benefits.240 The court held that this right "is not simply any right to which an employee may conceivably become entitled,
but rather any right to which an employee may become entitled pursuant to an existing, enforceable obligation assumed by the employ'
Since McGann's health insurance plan's summary description
er."24

permitted his employer to modify or amend benefits at any time,
McGann was incapable of demonstrating that he had an immutable
right to a specific level of benefits.242
Further, even if the summary description had not contained language allowing the plan's sponsor to terminate or modify welfare
benefits, the court indicated that it still would have found McGann
incapable of adducing that he had an entitlement to a given level of
benefits.243 The court's decision in McGann effectively prohibits individuals whose welfare benefits have been modified (even if the
modification is motivated by a discriminatory intent) from bringing a
Section 510 action unless an employee can show that the summary
plan description, or sponsoring employer, had in fact guaranteed that
the benefits would be permanent. 24

239.
240.

Id.
Id. at 405.

241. Id.
242. Id. ERISA provides that individuals covered by a pension or welfare plan must be
provided with a summary description of the plan's benefits. See 29 U.S.C. § 1023 (1988 &
Supp. V 1993).
243. McGann, 946 F.2d at 405 ('ERISA does not require such 'vesting' of the right to a
continued level of the same medical benefits once those are ever included in a welfare
plan.").
244. Id. The McGann decision has produced a huge outcry for either a welfare benefit
vesting provision in ERISA or a comprehensive national health insurance plan. For example,
after the Supreme Court refused to review the Fifth Circuit's decision in McGann, several
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A more recent decision, Owens v. Storehouse, Inc.,245 was
based upon a scenario almost identical to McGann, amply demonstrating how McGann has precluded successful Section 510 litigation

when an employer's decision to decrease or cap welfare benefits is
the basis of the suit. In Owens, an employer had modified its welfare

plan to incorporate a lifetime cap of $25,000 on benefits provided to
employees infected with the AIDS virus.2' Owens sought relief under ERISA Section 510, as well as a temporary restraining order
prohibiting the reduction of plan benefits. 7 His suit was dismissed
by the district court; that decision was affirmed by the Eleventh Circuit.2"
As in McGann, the Owens court based its decision on the fact
that Owens' employer's welfare plan amendment had not derogated
any right which he might have had to specific welfare benefits, find-

associations such as the AARP and the AMA called that decision "an outrage," lamenting
that
There are already almost 35 million Americans without health insurance, and tens
of millions more who are underinsured ... . By permitting employers to cut off
the health benefits of their employees after they - or one of their family members develop AIDS or any other serious illness, this decision will [increase] . . . the ranks of the uninsured.
Letter from the American Association of Retired Persons, the American Hospital Association,
the American Medical Association, the National Commission on AIDS, the National Governors' Commission, and the U.S. Conference of Mayors to Kenneth Starr, U.S. Solicitor General
(Aug. 10, 1992), in High Court Declines to Review Insurance Discrimination Case for Employees With AIDS, HEALTH POLICY AND BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH NEWS OF THE WEEK (F-DC Reports, Chevy Chase Md.), Nov. 11, 1992, at 13.
Other commentators have extolled the soundness of the McGann decision, since to
them any other interpretation of § 510 would require a de facto vesting of welfare benefits
once they were provided to employees. These commentators argue that de facto vesting would
actually create a disincentive for employers to provide any health benefits. See, e.g., Craig C.
Dirrim, Unpopular But Not Unfair: The Fifth Circuit Considers the Terms But Ignores the
Endearment in McGann v. H & H Music Co., 946 F.2d 410 (5th Cit. 1991), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 482 (1992), 72 NEB. L. REv. 860 (1993). These commentators, however, ignore
the fact that pension benefits are uniformly provided as part of employees' overall compensation package despite the fact that ERISA contains a pension vesting provision. Apparently,
vesting does not interfere with an employer's willingness to provide pension benefits, Why
should it interfere with an employer's willingness to provide health benefits? Ultimately, cost
is the critical factor which prevents employers from guaranteeing health benefits. While pension payouts can be more or less accurately determined by actuarial assessment, welfare benefit utilization and cost per employee is hardly as predictable. Nonetheless, actuarial data might
be used by employer-provided welfare plans to provide a basic guideline to assess costs on a
per employee basis.
245. 984 F.2d 394 (11th Cit. 1993).
246. Id. at 396-97.
247. Id. at 397.
248. Id. at 400.
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big that:
the record does not establish that Storehouse amended its plan to
interfere with the "attainment of any right" to which Owens might
have been entitled under section 510. The "right" referred to is not
any right in the abstract. Rather, it is one specifically conferred by
the plan or ERISA. As discussed, ERISA does not confer a right to
particular health benefits. 245
Additionally, the court found that since the cap was uniformly applied
to all employees, Owens could not prove the existence of the type of
discriminatory intent required under Section 5 10 O
From these decisions, it is clear that ERISA, standing alone, provides little protection for an individual whose health benefits have
been diminished or terminated. This is true even when a discriminatory motive is involved, primarily because ERISA lacks a vesting
provision for health benefits.
B. Denial of Welfare Benefits Under the Rehabilitation Act
After the enactment of the ADA, modification of benefits provided by a welfare plan may be violative of the ADA's anti-discrimination mandate. Before exploring this possibility, it is instructive to
examine cases involving the ADA's predecessor statute, the Rehabilitation Act, to first determine what effect that Act has had on covered
employees' benefit entitlements.
There are relatively few Rehabilitation Act decisions which involve the denial of a handicapped individual's welfare benefits entitlement. However, the few cases that do involve welfare benefit denial
reveal that a litigant suing under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act 1 has as difficult a burden proving a legally sufficient case as
does an ERISA litigant.
In Bernard B. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 2 a class action
suit was brought by class representatives suing Blue Cross/Blue
Shield (Blue Cross) under Section 504.
The suit was initiated
when Blue Cross modified plan benefits to exclude coverage for

249. Id. at 399.
250. Id.
251. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, sec. 504, § 794(a), 87 Stat. 357,
394 (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
252. 528 F. Supp. 125 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), affd, 679 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1982).
253. Id. at 127.
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psychiatric inpatient care. 4 Plaintiffs argued that the insurance
company's action had an adverse impact upon individuals suffering
from psychiatric disorders and was, therefore, impermissibly discriminatory." The district court denied plaintiffs' request for relief and
granted defendant's motion for summary judgment, holding that there
was no violation of the Rehabilitation Act because the plan's modification was based upon non-discriminatory factors, such as the huge
cost of coverage for inpatient psychiatric care."s6 In Bernard B., the
court noted that Blue Cross had not excluded certain insurance benefits only from individuals with psychiatric handicaps. 7 Clearly,
such an action would have been impermissible. Rather, the court
found that Blue Cross had implemented a limitation which applied to
all plan participants across the board: benefits were limited for both
the handicapped and nonhandicapped alike 5 Since the defendant's
determination to discontinue psychiatric benefits was at least partially
dictated by cost considerations, the court found the discontinuation to
be "substantially justified." 9 This rationale was sufficient to shield
the defendant from having violated the Rehabilitation Act.'
In Alexander v. Choate," the Supreme Court considered whether the limitation or elimination of welfare benefits by a covered employer was contrary to the protection afforded by the Rehabilitation
Act to handicapped individuals."s The Court was asked to determine
whether the Rehabilitation Act was violated by a Tennessee legislative
proposal to reduce the number of days of state-provided Medicaid
benefits for inpatient medical services from 20 to 14 days.263
The plaintiffs in Alexander, Medicaid recipients, argued that
since handicapped individuals were more likely to require a longer
duration of inpatient hospital care than nonhandicapped individuals,
the legislature's proposal was inherently discriminatory, contending
that this benefit reduction would necessarily have an adverse and

254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 132-34.
257. Id. at 133.
258. Id. at 133-34.
259. Id. at 132. This court explicitly recognized the "substantial justification" exception to
§ 504, which was first espoused by the Second Circuit in Kampmeier v. Nyquist, 553 F.2d
296 (2d Cir. 1977). Bernard B., 528 F. Supp. at 132.
260. Id.
261. 469 U.S. 287 (1985).
262. See id.
263. Id. at 289.
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discriminatory impact on the handicapped.
The Court first considered whether discriminatory animus required by ERISA Section 510 was also a required element of an
action under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.'e It ultimately
held that if discriminatory animus was a necessary component of a
Section 504 action, then plaintiffs' case - based solely upon the
statistically adverse impact of defendant's proposal - was without a
sufficient legal basis.'
The Court also reviewed its prior holding in Guardians Ass'n v.
Civil Service Commission of New York City, 7 a case decided under
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, to determine whether disparate impact discrimination could be redressed under the Rehabilitation
Act.' Based upon Guardians, the Court held that the form of disparate impact discrimination challenged in Alexander was actionable
under the Rehabilitation Act, stating:
Guardians, therefore, does not support petitioners' blanket proposition that federal law proscribes only intentional discrimination
against the handicapped. Indeed, to the extent our holding in Guardians is relevant to the interpretation of § 504, Guardians suggests
that the regulations implementing § 504, upon which respondents in
part rely, could make actionable the disparate impact challenged in
this case.2'
The Court "assume[d] without deciding" that Congress had intended that "at least some conduct that has an unjustifiable disparate
impact on the handicapped" would be covered by Section 5 0 4 ."
According to the Court, the legislative history of the Rehabilitation
Act indicated that Section 504 was intended to address all forms of
discrimination regardless of how discriminatory conduct was manifested:

264. Id. Plaintiffs produced undisputed statistical evidence which revealed that "in the
1979-1980 fiscal year, 27.4% of all handicapped users of hospital services who received
Medicaid required more than 14 days of care, while only 7.8% of nonhandicapped users
required more than 14 days of inpatient care." Id. at 290.
265. Id. at 292.
266. Id.
267. 463 U.S. 582 (1983).
268. Alexander, 469 U.S. at 292-94; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)
(prohibiting programs receiving federal grants and federal aid from discriminating against
individuals based on race or ethnicity).
269. Alexander, 469 U.S. at 294.
270. Id. at 299.
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Discrimination against the handicapped was perceived by Congress to be most often the product, not of invidious animus, but
rather of thoughtlessness and indifference - of benign neglect ....
Federal agencies and commentators on the plight of the handicapped
similarly have found that discrimination against the handicapped is
primarily the result of apathetic attitudes rather than affirmative
animus.
In addition, much of the conduct that Congress sought to alter
in passing the Rehabilitation Act would be difficult if not impossible
to reach were the Act construed to proscribe only conduct fueled by
a discriminatory intentY'
Hence, plaintiffs' evidence of the disparate impact of Tennessee's
proposition was deemed sufficient to set forth a prima facie case
under Section 504.' This holding is extremely significant in regard
to the ADA, since the ADA is modeled on the Rehabilitation Act and
prohibits the same forms of discrimination as its predecessor.
Nevertheless, though it recognized the state's proposal would
have an adverse impact on handicapped employees, the Court in Alexander denied plaintiffs their requested relief, finding that the
legislature's proposal was neutral on its face and did not bar handicapped individuals from receiving the same benefits that nonhandicapped individuals would receive.273
Although it was not explicitly stated by the Court as a basis for
its holding, since Tennessee's decision to decrease its Medicaid benefits was premised on the state's desire to reduce Medicaid costs, there
apparently was a "substantial justification" for the state's discriniinatory treatment of handicapped individuals. In Alexander the Supreme
Court implicitly accepted the "substantial justification" defense posited
in both Bernard B. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield 4 and Kampmeier
v. NyquistS In each of these cases, an employer's decision to eliminate excessive insurance costs was deemed a sufficient basis for its
decision to modify health insurance benefits in a way which impaired

271. Id. at 295-97 (footnotes omitted).
272. See id. at 291-92.
273. Id. at 309 ("The State has made the same benefit . . . equally accessible to both
handicapped and nonhandicapped persons, and the State is not required to assure the handicapped 'adequate health care' by providing them with more coverage than the

nonhandicapped.").
274. 528 F. Supp. 125, 132 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
275. 553 F.2d 296, 299 (2d Cir. 1977).
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handicapped individuals' entitlements to benefits. 276
If decisions under the Rehabilitation Act are used as a model for
determinations rendered under the ADA, it would seem that in only
very few instances would an employer's decision to limit health benefits create liability. As long as an employer could show that there
was either a non-discriminatory reason for the modification, or substantial justification for it such as the necessity of reducing plan costs,
no legal action would lie. However, this result is not inevitable. As is
discussed in the next section, the ADA contains specific language
regarding employee benefits and stricter scrutiny of an employer's
decision to limit benefits is justified.
C. The ADA and Employee Welfare Benefit Entitlement
The ADA contains specific language which addresses employee
benefit plans which is not contained within the Rehabilitation Act and
which is without precedent in civil rights legislation. Section 12201(c)
of the ADA provides:
Subchapters I through II of this chapter and Title IV of this Act
shall not be construed to prohibit or restrict (1) an insurer, hospital or medical service company,
health maintenance organization, or any agent, or entity that administers benefit plans, or similar organizations from underwriting risks,
classifying risks, or administering such risks that are based on or
not inconsistent with State law; or
(2) a person or organization covered by this chapter
from establishing, sponsoring, observing or administering the terms
of a bona fide benefit plan that are based on underwriting risks,
classifying risks, or administering such risks that are based on or
not inconsistent with State law; or
(3) a person or organization covered by this chapter
from establishing, sponsoring, observing or administering the terms
of a bona fide benefit plan that is not subject to State laws that
regulate insurance.
Paragraphs(1), (2), (3) shall not be used as a subterfuge to evade
the purposes of subchapter [sic] I and III of this chapterYn
Recently, a federal court has interpreted this provision in a way
which might render employers culpable under the ADA if they termi-

276.
277.

See id. at 299-300; Bernard B., 528 F. Supp. at 132.
42 U.S.C. § 12201(c) (Supp. V 1993) (emphasis added).
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nate or cap welfare benefits in a manner which discriminates against
handicapped individuals. 78 Apparently, the ADA's anti-discrimination mandate also applies to employer welfare benefit plans established under ERISAY9 In Donaghey, one of the first federal court
decisions interpreting the application of Section 12201(c)(3) of the
ADA, the court was asked to determine whether the ADA prohibited
a welfare benefit plan modification which virtually eliminated benefits
for AIDS patients."s° In that case, the Mason Tenders Welfare Fund
initiated a suit against both the EEOC and several welfare fund participants who had claimed discriminatory changes to the fund benefits."8 The Fund sought a declaratory judgment that the ADA did
not apply to ERISA-covered welfare plans' and that, even if it did,
this did not prohibit the capping or elimination of health benefitsa
a situation virtually identical to that encountered by the Fifth Circuit in McGann and the Eleventh Circuit in Owens."s4 However, the
Southern District of New York's decision would now be based upon
the ADA rather than Section 510 of ERISA.
On November 19, 1993, the Fund moved for summary judgment
and sought an order granting it the full relief contained in its complaint. In an oral decision issued from the bench, United States District Court Judge John E. Sprizzo denied the Fund's motion and
found that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the
Fund's elimination of coverage for AIDS patients had violated the
ADA.S
Despite the Fund's arguments, the court determined that an
ERISA fund was a covered entity under the ADA, holding paramount
the fact that the statute provided that employer-supplied health insurance could not be used as a subterfuge to evade the purposes of the

278.

See Donaghey, supra note 197, at 1.

279. As stated previously, supra note 208, these types of plans are specifically exempted
from modification or regulation by state law.
280.

See Donaghey, supra note 197, at 3.

281. The participants in the program had initially filed charges with the EEOC alleging
that the welfare fund had violated the ADA. See Complaint of Terrence Donaghey, EEOC
Charge Number 160930419 (filed Nov. 19, 1992).
282. See Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, Donaghey v. Mason Tenders Dist. Council
Welfare Fund, 92 Civ. 6301 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (Mason Tenders filed an action for declaratory
judgment against Donaghey and the EEOC).
283.

Id. at 26.

284. See supra text accompanying notes 227-46.
285. See Donaghey, supra note 197, at 20 (transcript of plaintiff's oral argument on motion for summary judgment, Nov. 19, 1993).
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ADA."S The court found that the language in Section 11221(c)(3)
indicated that such funds were indeed within the parameters of "covered entities" under the ADA.' Judge Sprizzo found that Congress
had intended that the ADA apply to welfare plans because:
why talk about pension plans at all if there were no way in which
an ERISA trustee could be liable under the ADA?... I wonder
what Congress was talking about when they talked about a fund not
being a basis to avoid the ADA if the ADA didn't apply in the first
place to funds, which seems to be most of your argument...
[Y]our argument flies in the face of the language of the statute
which says the ADA applies notwithstanding any other provision of
law which would include ERISA. They specifically make reference
to the fact that a fund is not a way to avoid liability under ADA,
which seems to be redundant if there could be no liability under the
ADA on the part of the funds."
That this was the result intended by Congress is borne out by
the ADA's legislative history. The House Education & Labor Committee Report stated that
This legislation [§ 501(c)] assures that decisions concerning the
insurance of persons with disabilities which are not based on bona

286. Donaghey, supra note 197, at 19.
287. Donaghey, supra note 197, at 19; see also Monroe Foods, supra note 197 (Judge
Joseph H. Young issuing a memorandum decision denying defendant's motion for summary
judgment), wherein the district court also considered and rejected a similar claim that a jointly administered ERISA welfare fund was not an entity covered by the ADA. The Monroe
court held that:
[the] EEOC and Johnson argue that under the ADA, the employers have a duty as
employers, regardless of whether they actually manage the Fund, to ensure that the
Fund did not include disability-based discriminatory provisions .... [lit is clear
they have presented evidence showing that the employers have a relationship with
the Trustees. The employers incorporated in their collective bargaining agreements
the creation of the Fund to administer health and other benefits to its employees... .. Again, these matters raise factual disputes as to whether or not the employers, directly or indirectly, had control over the Trustees' decisions and, again,
preclude granting of summary judgment.
Monroe Foods, supra note 197, at 2. Thus, both the Donaghey and Monroe courts denied
summary judgment, holding that the cases before them presented triable issues of fact.
288. Donaghey, supra note 197, at 4-8. Judge Sprizzo also premised his decision on
ERISA § 514(d), which provides that "by its own terms ERISA shall not be construed to
alter, amend, modify, invalidate, impair, or supersede federal law or any rule or regulation
The Fund's argument that only
issued under such law." 29 U.S.C. § 1144(d) (1988).
ERISA guides the operation of its welfare fund was shown to be erroneous by ERISA's own
terms, the court concluded, and there is no inherent incompatibility between the ADA and
ERISA. Donaghey, supra note 197, at 10-11.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1995

47

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 12, Iss. 2 [1995], Art. 3
Hofstra Labor Law Journal

[Vol. 12:2

fide risk classification be made in conformity with non-discrimination requirements. Without such a clarification, this legislation could
arguably find violative of its provisions any action taken by an
insurer or employer which treats disabled persons differently under
an insurance or benefit plan because they represent an increased
hazard of death or illness.2 9
Thus, the plaintiffs argument that only ERISA covered the operation
of the Mason Tenders District Council Welfare Fund was correctly
rejected by the court; McGann and its progeny did not dictate that
summary judgment be granted in this instance.21° This would have
been the result had the court found that only ERISA provided the
standards by which the trustee's conduct was to be judged.
Nevertheless, a decision contrary to Donaghey was issued two
years ago by the United States District Court for the District of New
Hampshire in Carparts Distribution Center v. Automotive Wholesaler's Ass'n of New England."" This action involved an employee's
suit against the Automotive Wholesaler's Association of New England
Insurance Plan ("AWANE"), which had placed a $25,000 lifetime cap
on benefits provided to individuals infected with the AIDS virus.2"
As was the case in McGann, this limitation was implemented immediately after the fund discovered that the plaintiff was HIV positive."
The district court in Carparts held that although a direct employer
might be considered a covered entity under the ADA, the fund which
provided an employee's welfare benefits was not; therefore, the
plaintiffs ADA claim was dismissed.294 This decision was, in large
part, based upon the court's extremely limited interpretation of the
ADA's definition of a covered entity?95
289. HoUSE COMM. ON EDUCATION AND LABOR, AMERICANS WTH DisABmTIEs ACT Op
1990, H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 136-38 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 419-21.

290. See id.
291. 826 F. Supp. 583 (D.N.H. 1993).
292. Id. at 584-85.
293. Id. at 585; see supra text accompanying note 230.
294. Carparts,826 F. Supp. at 589.

295. The district court held that under the ADA:
a covered entity is defined to include "an employer, employment agency, labor
organization, or joint labor-management committee." 42 U.S.C. § 12111(2).
Carparts, as the former employer of Randy Senter, qualifies as a covered entity.
Paragraph 24 of plaintiff's amended complaint states that AWANE and [the]
AWANE PLAN are also covered entities under § 12111(2). This is incorrect. Nei-

ther AWANE nor AWANE PLAN qualify as a covered entity as that term is
defined in the statute as neither was an employer of Randy J. Senter.
Carparts, 826 F. Supp. at 585.
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However, the First Circuit rejected the district court's narrow
interpretation of "employer" under the ADA, and looked to cases
brought under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to interpret and define
this term.2" The appellate court clearly espoused three theories
which could render AWANE an "employer" under the ADA and thus
subject the health insurer to liability under the Act.2"
Under the first theory, the court held that AWANE could be an
employer if it "exercised control over an important aspect of [Senter's] employment.""29 Second, if AWANE was found to be an
agent of Carparts, Senter's employer, then the plan could be considered an employer because it was acting "on behalf of [a covered]
entity in the matter of providing and administering employee health
benefits."2' Lastly, the court found that under Section 12112(a) of
the ADA, an employer may not discriminate against a "'qualified
individual with a disability... in regard to' specified enumerated aspects of employment,"3 ' ° and further noted that "[a] number of cases ... have interpreted analogous provisions of Title VII to apply to
actions taken by a defendant against a plaintiff who is not technically
an employer of that employee."' Hence, the action was remanded
back to the district court to reexamine the facts of the case in light of
the standards established by the First Circuit." 2
As the First Circuit noted, prior case law formulated under Title
VII has advocated a more comprehensive view of what entities are
covered by civil rights statutes. For example, in Spirt v. Teachers
Insurance & Annuity Ass'n, °3 a university professor sued her pension fund on the ground that its sex-based mortality tables violated
Title VII. The Second Circuit held that even though the pension
fund was not the plaintiff's direct employer, it could still be found
liable under Title VII since:

296. Carparts Distribution Ctr., Inc. v. Automotive Wholesaler's Ass'n of New England,
37 F.3d 12, 16 (1st Cir. 1994). The court noted: "[t]he issue before us is not whether defendants were employers of Senter within the common sense of the word, but whether they can

be considered 'employers' for purposes of Title I of the ADA and therefore subject to liability for discriminatorily denying employment benefits to Senter." Id.
297. Id. at 16-18.

298. Id. at 17.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.

Id.
Id. at 18 (citations omitted).
Id.
Id.
691 F.2d 1054 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 881 (1984).
Id. at 1056.
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it is generally recognized that the term 'employer,' as it is used in
Title VII, is sufficiently broad to encompass any party who significantly affects access of any individual to employment opportunities,
regardless of whether that party may technically be described as an
'employer' of an aggrieved individual as that term has generally
305
been defined at common law.
Clearly, Spirt's conception of an employer is as equally applicable to Title VII as it is to the ADA. 31 The weight of legal authority, as well as the ADA's legislative history, suggests that a more
expansive definition of employer under the ADA is warranted; one
which would include ERISA funds.
In Donaghey, having initially determined that the Mason Tenders
Welfare Fund was a covered entity under the ADA, Judge Sprizzo
was next required to ascertain whether a material question of fact
existed regarding the Fund's allegedly discriminatory conduct. If the
Donaghey action had been decided in accordance with the Rehabilitation Act, in order for the Fund to succeed on summary judgment its
only burden would be to show that its decision to eliminate benefits
'
However, as will
for AIDS' patients was "substantially justified. '""e
be discussed, since the ADA's "subterfuge" standard varies considerably from the Rehabilitation Act's "substantial justification" standard,
more needed to be shown.
As a result of his analysis of the ADA's statutory language,
Judge Sprizzo equated the ADA's concept of subterfuge with Title
VII's notion of pretext:" °s
the language of the statute suggests very strongly that this issue of
whether what they have done or not done is a violation of the law
turns upon whether it is or is not a pretext. I think the word "sub-

305. Id. at 1063 (citation omitted). See also Grossman v. Suffolk County Dist. Attorney's

Office, 777 F. Supp. 1101 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (state retirement system created to administer
public employers' retirement benefits was considered to be an employer under ADEA).
306.

There does not appear to be any reported cases which decide the issue whether an

employee benefit plan provided or subsidized by the federal government is a covered "program or entity" under § 794 of the Rehabilitation Act.
307.

See Donaghey, supra note 197, at 20.

308. In traditional Title VII analysis, an employee may rebut an employer's "business
necessity" defense to his or her prima facie Title VII action by showing that the defense was

merely a pretext to mask the employer's underlying discriminatory motivation. See, e.g.,
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (establishing that the burden of

proof in a Title VII case shifts between plaintiff and defendant once a prima facie case is
set forth).
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terfuge" is another way to talk about pretext, and that entails factual
issues that have to be tried. ... The question is, have you denied
them benefits on the basis of what I call bona fide actuarial assumptions, or have you done something which looks like actuarial
assumptions and is not? When I talk about the traditional analysis
being applicable, they have the burden of proving that you have
acted for discriminatory reasons. They don't have to prove bad faith
or specific intent, but they have to prove, either on a disparate
impact theory or a disparate treatment theory, that you have, in
effect, discriminated against them because of their disability. I suspect your defense will be that you did what is good for the fund,
based on good actuarial assumptions. That sounds to me like a
pretext argument. I think subterfuge and pretext in the context of
this argument are interchangeable. You have carved out this one
assumption based on actuarial assumptions, and there will have to
be a trial on this issue.3
In Donaghey, if the complainant is ultimately capable of showing
that the Fund's underlying decision to eliminate benefits was a pretext
to discriminate against employees infected with the AIDS virus, then
the Fund's conduct is violative of the ADA. If the Fund can demonstrate that it had a sound actuarial basis justifying the plan's modification, then no violation has occurred."'
Judge Sprizzo's decision provides some guidance on what Congress intended by the ADA's "subterfuge" terminology.' He analyzed this concept in relation to one already established under Title
VII jurisprudence: pretext. Recent case law under the Age Discrimi-

nation in Employment Act ("ADEA") -

which, until recently, also

contained a subterfuge requirement - provides some added insight
into how courts may interpret the ADA's subterfuge requirement." 2
The ADEA's notion of subterfuge was reviewed by the Supreme

309. Donaghey, supra note 197, at 19-21.
310. After summary judgment was denied, the court refused the Fund's request for an
immediate appeal. See Order, Mason Tenders Dist. Council Welfare Fund v. Donaghey, 93
Civ. 1154 (S.Dist. Rep.) (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (Order dated Sept. 1, 1994) (Sprizzo, J.). The ac-

don is presently scheduled for a final pre-trial conference in June 1995. No trial date has yet
been established. Telephone Interview with John Gresham, Esq., of New York Lawyers for
the Public Interest, Inc., representing Donaghey (May 2, 1995).
311. The EEOC's Technical Assistance Manual provides some additional assistance. It defines subterfuge as a "disability-based disparate treatment that is not justified by the risks or
costs associated with the disability." EEOC MANUAL, supra note 12, at E-2.
312. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Until recently, the ADEA stated
that an employer may "observe the terms of ... any bona fide employee benefit plan such
as a retirement, pension, or insurance plan which is not a subterfuge to evade the purposes
of this chapter." Id. § 623(f(2).
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Court in Public Employees Retirement System v. Betts, 13 wherein
the Court considered whether a state-provided welfare benefit plan
which excluded disability benefits to employees who retired over the
age of sixty violated the ADEA.314 The Court found that a restriction on a retiree's disability benefits did not violate the ADEA and
that a plan was not a "subterfuge" unless it discriminated in a manner
forbidden by the ADEA's other substantive provisions.3 1 In effect,
the burden falls on the plaintiff to prove that the "discriminatory"
plan provision was intended to "serve the purpose of discriminating in
some non-fringe-benefit aspect of the employment relation."316 The
Court rejected the plaintiffs' ADEA claim since they were incapable
of demonstrating that the plan's limitation was intended to discriminate against them in some aspect of their employment relationship
other than fringe benefit entitlements." 7
If Betts is considered controlling, any attempt to apply the ADA
to employee benefit entitlements would be futile. Implicit in any
court's decision to follow Betts is a determination that the ADA does
not cover employee benefit plans. This is the result that was advocat3 8
ed by the Mason Tenders Welfare Fund's counsel in Donaghey.
The ADA's legislative history, however, reveals that the Betts decision was not intended to be followed by courts presented with ADA
violations." 9 According to the House Committee on the Judiciary's
Report on the ADA, its substantive terms were meant to be applied
to employee benefit plans:
while a plan which limits certain kinds of coverage based on classification of risk would be allowed under this section, the plan my
[sic] not refuse to insure or refuse to continue to insure, or limit the
amount, extent, or kind of coverage available to an individual, or
charge a different rate for the same coverage solely because of a

313.

492 U.S. 158 (1989).

In Betts, the Court reiterated its previous holding in United

Airlines, Inc. v. McMann, 434 U.S. 192 (1977), that the term subterfuge should be interpreted
under the ADEA according to its ordinary meaning as "a scheme, plan, stratagem, or artifice
of evasion" Betts, 492 U.S. at 167.
314. Id. at 161-65.
315. Id. at 177.
316. Id. at 181.
317. It was the Betts decision which prompted the enactment of the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act, which eliminated the subterfuge provision in the ADEA. See Older Workers Benefit Protection Act ("OWBPA"), Pub. L. No. 101-433, 104 Stat. 978 (1990) (current
version at 29 U.S.C. § 621 (Supp. V 1993)).
318. Donaghey, supra note 197, at 7 (Damien Mysak, counsel for plaintiff).
319. H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note 55, at 71.
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physical or mental impairment, except where the refusal, limitation,
or rate differential is based on sound actuarial principles, or is related to actual or reasonably anticipated experience.320
Furthermore, according to one of the Act's key sponsors, the ADA's
"subterfuge" term was not identical to the term as applied in Betts.
ADA sponsor Senator Kennedy stated during the Senate debates on
the ADA that:
it is important to note that the term subterfuge as used in the
ADA, should not be interpreted in the manner in which the Supreme Court interpreted the term in Betts. The term subterfuge is
used in the ADA to denote a means of evading the purposes of
the ADA. Under its plain meaning, it does not connote that there
must be some malicious or purposeful intent to evade the ADA
on the part of the insurance company.... It also does not mean
that a plan is automatically shielded just because it was put into
place before the ADA was passed ....

The provision regarding

subterfuge section [12201(c)] should not be undermined by a
restrictive reading of the term 'subterfuge' as the Supreme Court
did in Betts.32
Thus, how Section 12201(c) of the ADA will actually be applied
is yet to be seen after the decisions of cases such as Donaghey and
Monroe Foods. Tentatively, it appears that the concept of subterfuge
as applied in litigation under the ADEA will be found inapplicable to
the ADA. Judge Sprizzo appears to have recognized this by holding
that the ADA applies to ERISA plans, and that an ADA subterfuge is
more comparable to Title VII "pretext" than a subterfuge as defined
in ADEA litigation."n
PART IV
ARBITRATION AND ADA EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS
Since the Supreme Court decided the Steelworkers' Trilogy cases
in 1960,"z arbitration has unassailably become the preferred method

320. H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note 55, at 71.
321. 136 CONG. REc. 59,697 (daily ed. July 13, 1990) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
322. See supra text accompanying notes 307-12.
323. The Steelworkers' Trilogy consists of three Supreme Court decisions which are
jointly cited for the proposition that a labor arbitration award may not be vacated or even reviewed by a court if the award has its basis within the terms of the collective bargaining
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for the resolution of industrial conflict. This preference for arbitration
has largely developed because of the particular expertise which labor

arbitrators acquire both in the "law of the shop" and labor contract
administration, and the normally final and binding nature of arbitration awards.324 Contractual labor arbitration clauses are now so per-

vasive that a recent study conducted by the Bureau of National Affairs found that ninety-eight percent of the collective bargaining
agreements sampled contained some form of arbitration provision."
There are several well established exceptions to the rule that

arbitration awards are final. Thus, a court may review or even vacate
a labor arbitration decision if it is alleged that a union has breached
its duty of fair representation to a bargaining unit member during the
course of a grievance investigation or hearing.326 In this situation,
the award produced as a result of that breach is subject to de novo
review.327 If the union's duty of fair representation was in fact violated, then the award is rescinded and the respective rights of the
parties are re-determined by the reviewing court.32

Another instance when an arbitration award is not considered
final and binding is where its underlying grievance involves an alleged violation of civil rights created under Title VII. 29 In Alexan-

agreement under which the dispute was submitted. See United Steelworkers v. Warrior &
Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363
U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
These decisions established a judicially recognized preference for arbitration as a means of
resolving industrial disputes.
It should be noted that the Taft-Hartley Act also recognizes that national labor policy
in the United States favors the arbitration of industrial conflict. That Act states:
Final adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties is declared to be the
desirable method for settlement of grievance disputes arising over the application or
interpretation of an existing collective-bargaining agreement.
29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
324. See Warrior & Gulf Navigation, 363 U.S. at 581.
325. See Basic Patterns in Union Contracts, 2 Collective Bargaining Negot. & Contr.
(BNA) 51:5 (Mar. 2, 1995).
326. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 174-88 (1967).
327. See id. In Vaca, the Supreme Court held that a union violates its duty of fair representation towards a collective bargaining unit member when its conduct towards that member
is in bad faith, arbitrary or discriminatory. Id. at 190. In such a situation, a bargaining unit
member may either sue its union and the employer with which he or she has a dispute under § 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act, or file charges against the union with the National Labor
Relations Board under § 158(b)(1). See id.; 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1) (1988).
328. See, e.g., Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554 (1976).
329. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974). Other instances in which
arbitration awards are not final include those where arbitrators consider rights created under
the Fair Labor Standards Act. These statutory rights exist independently of a collective bargaining agreement providing for grievance arbitration, even though the agreement may contain
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der v. Gardner-Denver Co., the Supreme Court held that the arbitration process is particularly ill-suited to determine these rights."'
Thus, an individual who claims that his fights under Title VII were
violated may initiate a federal suit after an arbitration hearing is conducted, even if his grievance has been denied."'
Gardner-Denver is particularly noteworthy because of its effect
upon arbitrations which consider ADA employment discrimination
claims. As previously noted, the ADA has created co-requisite statutory obligations for covered entities not to discriminate against qualified job applicants or employees due to their disability, and to provide reasonable accommodations for disabled individuals who are
capable, with the assistance of a reasonable accommodation, to perform the essential functions of a job. 2 These obligations exist independently from union and management obligations created by a collective bargaining agreement. Gardner-Denver raises the primary
question whether a grievant is entitled to initiate a plenary ADA suit
after his or her claim is adjudicated under the grievance machinery of
a collective bargaining agreement. 3
This final section will consider the potential effect of the Gardner-Denver decision upon grievance arbitration awards which decide
ADA claims. It will also consider the related issue of whether a
mandatory arbitration agreement will supplant an individual's right to
initiate a federal claim under the ADA. Finally, I shall explore the
correct standards by which an arbitrator might be required to decide
ADA claims. In sum, this section will explore the tension between
the statutory rights created by the ADA and the national labor policy
recognizing arbitration as the favored means of resolving industrial
disputes.

provisions mirroring statutory language. Courts have held that the submission to arbitration of
claims which have their basis in these statutes does not bar a grievant from subsequently
initiating a federal court suit based on the same facts, thereby allowing a grievant two bites

of the apple. See Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728 (1981); Marshall v. N.L. Indus., 618 F.2d 1220 (7th Cir. 1980); see also Occupational Safety and Health
Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
330. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 56-58.
331. The arbitration award may, however, be considered probative evidence regarding the
alleged Title VII violation in the federal lawsuit. See Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 60 n.21.
332. See supra text accompanying notes 16-47.
333. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 38.
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A. To Arbitrate or not to Arbitrate
It appears quite likely that the Gardner-Denver doctrine will be
deemed applicable to ADA claims brought to arbitration, especially in
light of decisions such as Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System,
Inc.,34 McDonald v. City of West Branch,335 and Marshall v. N.L.
Industries, Inc.,336 where courts have applied the Gardner-Denver
holding to arbitrations concerning other important federal statutory
rights. 7 The ADA seems particularly appropriate for similar treatment because as a civil rights statute, like Title VII, it is meant to
ensure an individual's right to equal opportunities for employment.
The Court in Gardner-Denverexplained the difference between statutory rights and rights manifested in a collective bargaining agreement,
pointing out that:
[Title VII] concerns not majoritarian processes, but an individual's
right to equal employment opportunities. [Its] strictures are absolute
and represent a congressional command that each employee be free
from discriminatory practices. Of necessity, the rights conferred can
form no part of the collective-bargaining process since waiver of
these rights would defeat the paramount congressional purpose behind Title VII.

In submitting his grievance to arbitration, an employee seeks to
vindicate his contractual right under a collective-bargaining agreement. By contrast, in filing a lawsuit under Title VII, an employee
asserts independent statutory rights accorded by Congress. The distinctly separate nature of these contractual and statutory rights is not

334. 450 U.S. 728, 737 (1981).
335. 466 U.S. 284, 288-92 (1984).
336. 618 F.2d 1220, 1222 (7th Cir. 1980).
337. Even though the ADA's legislative history indicates that arbitration is considered the
preferable method of dispute resolution, see 136 CONG. REC. H4582, H4606 (daily ed. July
12, 1990), it was not meant to supplant federal rights created under the statute. As was noted

in the Judiciary Committee Report on the ADA, arbitration of an ADA claim was not meant
to waive an individual's entitlement to sue under the Act. The Judiciary Committee pointed

out that "any agreement to submit disputed issues to arbitration, whether in the context of a
collective bargaining agreement or in an employment contract, does not preclude the affected
person from seeking relief under the enforcement provisions of this Act." HousE COMM. ON
JuDICIARY, AmmuCANS WITH DIsABILTEs Acr OF 1990, H.R. REP. No. 596, 101st Cong.,
2d Sess. 89 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 565, 598.
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vitiated merely because both were violated as a result of the same
factual occurrence. And certainly no inconsistency results from permitting both rights to be enforced in their respectively appropriate
forums.33

Similarly, an ADA claim in an arbitration proceeding should not
waive the grievant's right to initiate a plenary ADA action in federal
court. As in Gardner-Denver, federal rights created under the ADA
are not subsumed within the rights created by a collective bargaining
agreement, even if that agreement contained language prohibiting
employment discrimination against disabled individuals.
A more difficult question is presented by the issue of whether
arbitration is a mandatory condition precedent to the initiation of an
ADA claim. The ADA itself contains language not previously found
in any other civil rights statute indicating that alternate means of
dispute resolution ("ADR") is the preferable method of resolving
statutory claims:
where appropriate, and to the extent authorized by law, the use

of alternative means of dispute resolution, including settlement,
negotiations, conciliation, facilitation, mediation, factfinding,
minitrials, and arbitration, is encouraged to resolve disputes arising under this chapter.339

This language indicates that Congress may have intended ADA claims
to proceed to arbitration first, assuming such claims were grievable
under the applicable collective bargaining agreement, before an aggrieved individual is permitted to commence legal proceedings. The

338. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 51.
339. 42 U.S.C. § 12212 (Supp. V 1993). The legislative history of this section clearly
indicates that Congress intended that the Supreme Court's holding in Gardner-Denverwould
apply to the ADA:
This amendment was adopted to encourage alternative means of dispute resolution
that are already adopted by law. The committee wishes to emphasize, however, that
the use of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms is intended to supplement, not
supplant, the remedies provided by this Act. Thus, for example, the committee
believes that any agreement to submit disputes to arbitration, whether in the context of a collective agreement or in an employment contract, does not preclude the
affected person from seeking relief under the enforcement provisions of this Act.
This view is consistent with the Supreme Court's interpretation of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, whose remedial provisions are incorporated by reference
in Title I. The committee believes that the approach articulated by the Supreme
Court in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. applies equally to the ADA and does
not intend that the inclusion of Section 513 be used to preclude rights and remedies that would otherwise be available to persons with disabilities.
H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note 55, at 76-77.
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3" Title VII litiCourt did not address this issue in Gardner-Denver.

gants simply assumed they had the ability to bring a federal lawsuit
once arbitration proceedings concluded.

In 1991, the Supreme Court dealt with a comparable issue in
" ' In Gilmer,
Gilmer v. InterstatelJohnsonLane Corp.34
the Court was
presented with the issue of whether an individual who had entered
into a private employment contract with the Securities Exchange

Commission which required the arbitration of all disputes under that
agreement was prohibited from commencing an ADEA action in federal court. 42 The employment contract's arbitration clause was
found to be specifically enforceable.343 Consequently, the Court dismissed plaintiff Gilmer's action on the ground that he failed to arbitrate his employment discrimination claim and granted Gilmer's

employer's motion to compel arbitration because arbitration of the
dispute was deemed mandatory.3"
The Court's decision to compel arbitration was premised on the
plaintiff having entered into the employment contract, thereby personally agreeing to submit his age discrimination claim to arbitration. 4

340. In Gardner-Denverthe Court did, however, consider the weight to be accorded to an
arbitration award in a subsequent federal action:
We adopt no standards as to the weight to be accorded an arbitral decision, since
this must be determined in the court's discretion with regard to the facts and circumstances of each case. Relevant factors include the existence of provisions in the
collective-bargaining agreement that conform substantially with Title VII, the degree
of procedural fairness in the arbitral forum, adequacy of the record with respect to
the issue of discrimination, and the special competence of particular arbitrators.
Where an arbitral determination gives full consideration to an employee's Title VII
rights, a court may properly accord it great weight. This is especially true where
the issue is solely one of fact, specifically addressed by the parties and decided by
the arbitrator on the basis of an adequate record. But courts should ever be mindful that Congress, in enacting Title VII, thought it necessary to provide a judicial
forum for the ultimate resolution of discriminatory employment claims. It is the
duty of courts to assure the full availability of this forum.
Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 60 n.21. Thus, while the weight accorded to an arbitration
award will vary depending upon the adequacy of the arbitration hearing as well as the language contained within the collective bargaining agreement, the ultimate resolution of employment discrimination claims is left up to the courts.
341. 500 U.S. 20 (1991). Recently, the Second Circuit considered in the context of the
Fair Labor Standards Act whether arbitration is a necessary condition precedent to the initiation of a plenary suit. See Tran v. Tran, No. 94-7994, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 10235, at *7
(2d Cir. May 5, 1995) (holding, based on the Supreme Court's decisions in Gilmer and
Barrentine, that arbitration did not have to precede initiation of a suit).
342. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23.
343. Id.
344. Id. at 35.
345. Id. at 33.
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Therefore, the Court found no incongruity between the policy concerns of the ADEA and Gilmer's employment contract, which provided that all disputes between employer and employee would be subject
to mandatory arbitration."
The fact that Congress failed to bar mandatory arbitration, and
included statutory language in the ADEA suggesting that a "flexible"
approach should be taken, additionally indicated to the Court that it
would be permissible for arbitration to replace litigation as a means
of resolving age discrimination disputes. 47
An equally plausible, if not more persuasive, argument might be
advanced that the ADA also permits waiver of an employee's right to
initiate a plenary lawsuit if the employee contractually agrees to arbitrate the claims?' s However, since Gilmer suggests that a waiver is
only appropriate where the aggrieved party also is a party to the arbitration agreement,349 waiver of federal statutory rights may not be
appropriate in the collective bargaining context because individual
employees are not actual parties to the agreement. In this respect, the
Supreme Court attempted to distinguish its decisions in Gilmer and
Gardner-Denver:
In Gardner-Denver, the issue was whether a discharged employee
whose grievance had been arbitrated pursuant to an arbitration
clause in a collective-bargaining agreement was precluded from
subsequently bringing a Title VII action based upon the conduct that
was the subject of the grievance. In holding that the employee was
not foreclosed from bringing the Tide VII claim, we stressed that an
employee's contractual rights under a collective bargaining agreement are distinct from the employee's statutory Title VII rights.
We further expressed concern that in collective bargaining arbitration "the interests of the individual employee may be subordinated to the collective interests of all employees in the bargaining
unit."
There are several important distinctions between the GardnerDenver line of cases and the case before us. First, those cases
did not involve the issue of the enforceability of an agreement

346.
347.
348.
349.

Id. at 37.
Id. at 29.
See 42 U.S.C. § 12212 (Supp. V 1993).
Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 34.
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to arbitrate statutory claims. Rather, they involved the quite
different issue whether arbitration of contract-based claims
precluded subsequent judicial resolution of statutory claims.
Since the employees there had not agreed to arbitrate their
statutory claims, and the labor arbitrators were not authorized
to resolve such claims, the arbitration in those cases understandably was held not to preclude subsequent statutory actions. Second, because the arbitration in those cases occurred
in the context of a collective-bargaining agreement, the
claimants there were represented by their unions in arbitration
proceedings. An important concern therefore was the tension
between collective representation and individual statutory
rights, a concern not applicable to the present case.35
This decision seems to support the proposition that employees may
waive their right to have claims decided outside the arbitral context.
However, it also suggests that rights created under the ADA are analogous to the rights protected in cases such as Barrentine and
Gardner-Denver,rights which are non-waivable and for which a statutorily created remedy is always available regardless of the existence
of a mandatory contractual grievance arbitration provision covering
such a claim.
Recent case law under the ADA fails to adequately resolve this
contradiction. In Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc.,"'
the court held that an employee who had initiated a federal lawsuit
under the ADA was estopped from proceeding with her claim because
the collective bargaining agreement covering her employment contained a mandatory arbitration provision. 2 The court analogized the
facts of the case to those in Gilmer and found that plaintiff was not
entitled to litigate her claim:
The CBA [collective bargaining agreement] provides in pertinent
part that disputes under the CBA shall be governed by a grievance
procedure which provides for the compulsory submission of all
disputes ... to a neutral third party arbitrator whose decision shall

350. Id. at 33-35 (citations omitted).
351. 844 F. Supp. 1103 (W.D. Va. 1994).
352. Id. at 1107. In Austin, the plaintiff was an equipment cleaner and oiler-greaser at
Owens-Brockway Company. In 1992, she became disabled due to an injury sustained while
she was working. Id. at 1103-04. Instead of being reasonably accommodated by the offer of
lighter duty work, plaintiff's position was eliminated and the only other position available for
which she was qualified was given to another individual. After the elimination of her position, plaintiff initiated her ADA suit. Id. at 1103.
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be final and binding upon the parties....

Defendant claims that plaintiff did not follow the grievance
procedure set forth in the CBA and is therefore estopped from proceeding in the instant lawsuit. Defendant cites Gilmer v. InterstatelJohnson Lane Corporation ... in which the Supreme Court
held that a claim being brought under the ADEA of 1967 ... can

be subjected to compulsory arbitration pursuant to an arbitration
agreement ....

Defendant also points to amendments to the Civil

Rights Act of 1991 which indicate Congress' preference that employment discrimination claims be resolved in alternative dispute
forums.
Because plaintiff's complaint was subject to mandatory arbitration, the Gilmer line of cases applies here. Accordingly, because
plaintiff did not utilize the grievance procedures available ...
Summary Judgment will be granted in favor of defendant. 3
It should be stressed that the court's opinion in Austin did not focus
solely on the specific wording of the collective bargaining agreement's mandatory arbitration provision to support its holding. The
court in that case decided that arbitration would be required because
the ADA's own terms provided that it was the favored means of
resolving such claims.354
More recently, the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania decided contrarily in Bruton v. Southeastern
Pennsylvania Transportation Authority ("SEPTA"). 3 5 In Bruton, the
plaintiff asserted that his dismissal was, among other things, in violation of the ADA.356 SEPTA moved for a dismissal of plaintiff's
ADA claim on the ground that it was barred by a contractual arbitration clause in the collective bargaining agreement.357 Unlike the
court in Austin, this court held that plaintiffs statutory ADA claim
was not precluded by the arbitration clause, and it denied defendant's

353.
354.
355.

Id. at 1106-07.
Id. at 1107.
No. 94-3111, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12087 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 19, 1994).

356. Id. at *1. Brton was an employee of SEPTA. He was, during the term of his employment, an untreated alcoholic; a problem of which his employer was apparently aware. Id.
at *2. Due to his poor attendance, he was discharged from his position. The discharge was
grieved by Bruton's union and, as a result of the grievance, he entered into a last chance
agreement (an agreement which provisionally reinstated him and which was conditioned on
his obtaining medical treatment for his alcoholism) with SEPTA. Id. at *3-4. while Bruton
was enrolled in a rehabilitation program, he was again discharged due to additional disciplinary infractions. After a second grievance was rejected, Bruton commenced suit. Id. at *4.
357. Id. at *8-9.
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motion because:
While it is well established, as SEPTA argues, that a union has the
authority to make binding contractual agreements on behalf of the
employees that it represents

. . .

it does not follow that these agree-

ments can preclude a statutory claim. Even if the plaintiff's grievance had reached arbitration, the course SEPTA insists the plaintiff
was required to pursue, Bruton is not precluded from judicial resolution of his statutory claims. This is especially so in the cases of
collective bargaining agreements, as there is a potential disparity in
the interests of a union and the interests of an individual employee. .

.

. Congress may well have had this in mind when it enacted

the ADA provision which makes it illegal for employers to enter
into contracts with labor unions which would discriminate against a
disabled employee.35
Similar to the Gardner-Denverdecision, the court held that SEPTA's
arbitration agreement did not bar Bruton's suit since the arbitral forum was an improper one for the final adjudication of civil rights'
violations.5 9 As arbitration was the product of a collective bargaining unit's negotiation process, it was held to be inadequate to protect
an individual unit member's statutory rights." ° Plaintiff Bruton was
determined to have an inviolate right to proceed with his federal suit
despite his ability to seek arbitration.36 '
The position advanced in Bruton appears to be more palatable
and is more in accord with the Supreme Court's edict in Gilmer, that
a mandatory arbitration provision would cause a waiver of statutory
rights in cases involving individual employment contracts but not in
those cases where collective bargaining agreements with arbitration
agreements exist.362 This point is one which the Austin court seems
to have entirely missed. It, therefore, would not be surprising if Austin is reversed on appeal.363

358. Id. at *5.
359. Id. at *8.
360. Id. at *7.
361. Id. at *8-9.
362. See Wendy S. Tien, Compulsory Arbitration of ADA Claims: Disabling the Disabled,
77 MINN. L. REV. 1443 (1993); see also Block v. Art Iron, Inc., 866 F. Supp. 380 (N.D.
Ind. 1994) (holding that a contractual arbitration clause does not waive an employee's right
to initiate a federal claim under the ADA). In Block, the district court found Gardner-Denver
controlling rather than Gilmer. Block, 866 F. Supp. at 383.
363. Counsel for Austin, Ms. Barbara Hudson, Esq., has advised the author that an appeal
of this decision was filed in February 1994 and was argued before the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in February 1995. On appeal, appellant argued, inter alia,
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B. Arbitration Standards
A more controversial issue concerns what standards an arbitrator
should follow when determining the merits of an ADA claim. There
are two diametrically opposed schools of thought on this subject.
Some arbitrators claim there should be a congruence between arbitral
and statutory standards for ADA claims, advocating the application of
external law to resolve arbitral disputes."6 On the other hand, many
arbitrators take a more traditional approach and base their decisions
solely upon the terms of the applicable collective bargaining agreement; knowledge of the requirements of external laws - such as the
ADA - is entirely irrelevant to their function as arbitrator.365 Resolution of the ADA claims which they are called upon to decide will
be based upon contractual terms only.
Frank and Edna Elkouri, authorities in the field of arbitration,
note that the degree to which either view is adhered to by an arbitrator is dependent upon a multitude of factors including the arbitrator
involved and the facts in dispute, as well as the particular statute
implicated:
The reader will observe that many arbitrators do give consideration
to "the law," but the extent of adherence thereto may vary considerably from case to case depending largely upon the service, form
and status of the legal rule or principle before the arbitrator....
Clearly defined law will be given more consideration than unsettled
and uncertain law or rules based upon controversial views as to
what should be the public policy.
Then, too, the extent to which an arbitrator will consider any
factor outside the collective agreement may depend upon the
degree to which the parties have restricted his authority to the

that the holding in Gilmer only applies to cases litigated under the Federal Arbitration Act, 9
U.S.C. §§ 1-307 (1988 & Supp. V 1993), and not to actions litigated under the Taft-Hartley
Act. Telephone Interview with Barbara Hudson, Esq., counsel for Linda Austin in action
against Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc. (Apr. 10, 1995).
364. See Susan T. MacKenzie, Arbitration and the ADA: Is Avoidance of External Law in
Grievance Arbitration Appropriate?, 19 N.Y. ST. B.A. LAB. & EMPL. L. SEcr. NEwsL. 12,
12 (1994). If external law becomes the ultimate guide for arbitrators presented with ADA

claims, there would be little justification for the concern whether the arbitral forum was appropriate for the determination of civil rights violations. The problems raised by GardnerDenver would become moot.
365. See, e.g., id. at 13.
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interpretation and application of the agreement, and upon his
view as the effect of that restriction insofar as consideration of
"law" is concerned. It is also to be noted that many arbitrators
have viewed the role of public enforcement agent to be beyond
their authority and function; these arbitrators believe that the
enforcement of statutes which impose affirmative duties or make
conduct illegal in an affirmative way should be left to the courts
or statutory agency which was established for that purpose."
Elkouri proposes that arbitrators adopt a more moderate and flexible
approach to the application of external law than they actually do in
practice. 67 It is not unusual to encounter arbitration awards which
concern similar factual patterns but which have opposite results because of the arbitrator's particular philosophical inclination regarding
the weight, if any, to be accorded to external law. The arbitration
decisions discussed below demonstrate this point.
In Altoona Hospital,"es the arbitrator refused to apply the ADA
to the dispute he was presented with because "the interpretation of
[the ADA] is a function of the appropriate agency or commission,
and ultimately the courts, not the arbitrator. The collective bargaining
agreement is his charter, and the solution to the question presented
'
must be found within its covers."369
This is a quintessential example
of the traditional approach, the cornerstone of which is the belief that
the sole source of an arbitrator's authority is the collective bargaining
agreement - hence provisions of the ADA may only be consulted by
an arbitrator if the collective bargaining agreement so provides.7
In Stone Container Corp.,"7 ' the arbitrator also refused to adjudicate the grievance according to the dictates of the ADA, stating that
366.
(4th ed.
367.
368.
369.

& EDNA A. ELKOUR, How ARBITRATION WORKS (BNA) 368-69
1985).
Id. at 369.
102 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 650 (1993) (Jones, Arb.).
Id. at 654. In Altoona, the contract arbitrator was presented with a grievance in
FRANK ELKOURi

which a disabled employee insisted that, upon her personal physician's recommendation, she
be permitted to return to work under an abbreviated work schedule. Nevertheless, the employer refused the grievant's request for an accommodation claiming that there was no job vacan-

cy available for her which would allow a shortened work schedule. Id. Additionally,
grievant's employer deemed the requested accommodation entirely unnecessary because two
independent physicians found her fit to return to duty without any work restriction whatsoever. Id.
370. The basis for this approach is the Steelworkers Trilogy, which mandates that in order
for an arbitration award to be judicially confirmable it must have its foundation in the terms
of the collective bargaining agreement under which the grievance was submitted. See supra

notes 323-25 and accompanying text.
371.

101 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 943 (1993) (Feldman, Arb.).
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he could not consider the ADA because the collective bargaining
agreement did not grant him the authority to do so.' 7 In that case,
the arbitrator noted that there was "no clear language placing before
the arbitrator the right to determine the answer to the grievance under
the law of the land."3 n
On the other side of the spectrum, the arbitrator in City of Dearborn Heights374 applied the ADA's reasonable accommodation requirement in contravention of the accepted terms of the collective
bargaining agreement under consideration.375 Not only was the
award based on sources external to the collective bargaining agreement, it was actually contrary to it. 76 Thus, the award was rendered
through a process which was the antithesis of that required by the
Steelworkers Trilogy and the traditional approach.
The next logical question is whether the traditional (contractual)
or the contemporary (statutory) approach is preferable in arbitration.
The traditional view is the more attractive of the two so long as the
arbitration process is viewed in purely contractual terms. Since the
parties bargained for arbitration according to the terms of the collective bargaining agreement, any consideration of external sources is in
violation of the agreement. Moreover, due to Gardner-Denver,plenary
federal civil rights actions are not waived by the submission of the
controversy to arbitration.3' Thus, there is no inherent danger of an
employer using a collective bargaining agreement as a shield to protect itself from ADA liability. 378 If an arbitration award is contrary
to the requirements of the ADA, then vindication can ultimately be
obtained in federal court. 79
The contemporary approach is more attractive to individuals who
see the arbitrator's role as an administrator of industrial justice, bound
by considerations of public policy as well as the terms of a collective
bargaining agreement. Any decision which runs afoul of civil rights
laws should not be deemed fair or in accord with public policy. To
proponents of this view, the arbitration process should play a larger
role; one which is capable of redressing social infirmities such as

372.
373.

Id. at 947.
Id. Nevertheless, in Stone Container Corp. the arbitrator did discuss, at least indirect-

ly, the effect the ADA might have had upon his decision had it been relevant. Id.
374. 101 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 809 (1993) (Kanner, Arb.).
375. Id. at 816.
376. Id.

377. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 54-55 (1974).
378.
379.

See id. at 55.
See id. at 59.
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discrimination and which includes the application of statutory law.
The danger in this approach is the fact that arbitration awards are, in
most respects, non-reviewable and nonappealable. What does a grievant do if an arbitrator fails to understand the law and comes to an
incorrect result?38° What protection does a grievant have against an
improper and inconsistent interpretation of the ADA?38'
Proponents of the contemporary approach point out that a recent
trend among federal courts addresses these problems. Some courts
have carved out another exception to the general precept that arbitration awards are final and non-reviewable by rescinding arbitration

awards on the ground that they were violative of public policy. 82
Under the "public policy exception," commentators argue that an
award which involves the misapplication of the ADA, or is contrary
to its goals, must be vacated.383
Several courts have in fact utilized the public policy exception to
vacate arbitration awards.384 For example, in Gulf Coast, the Fifth
Circuit affirmed a district court's vacatur of an award considered

violative of public policy." This decision is relevant because it
considers6 the ramifications of the ADA in its conception of public
38
policy.
In Gulf Coast, the district court vacated an award in which an

arbitrator had reinstated an employee who had used illegal drugs in
the work-place, holding that the grievant's reinstatement was totally
unjustified and contrary to the well-defined and dominant public
policy which prompted the promulgation of the Drug Free Workplace
Act. 31 The Fifth Circuit found that the lower court was justified in

380. The holding in Gardner-Denver would no longer apply. That Court's decision was
based on the arbitrator's unwillingness and incapability to consider external law such as Title
VII. As a result, mandatory arbitration would be the sole recourse for a victim of discrimination based on a disability.
381. See ELKOURI & ELKOUIu, supra note 366, at 419-36 (noting that the concept of
stare decisis holds much less weight in arbitration than it does under common law).
382. See, e.g., Gulf Coast Indus. Workers Union v. Exxon Co., 991 F.2d 244 (5th Cir.
1993); Stroehmann Bakeries v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 969 F.2d 1436 (3d Cir.
1992); Newsday, Inc. v. Long Island Typographical Union, 915 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1990).
383. See MacKenzie, supra note 364, at 14.
384. See Gulf Coast, 991 F.2d at 245; see also Stroehmann Bakeries, 969 F.2d at 1438;
Newsday, 915 F.2d at 841. In Stroehmann Bakeries and Newsday, appellate courts vacated
arbitration awards which reinstated a discharged employee accused of sexual harassment on
the grounds that such action violated the public policy against allowance of such conduct in
the workplace. Stroehmann Bakeries, 969 F.2d at 1438; Newsday, 915 F.2d at 841.
385. Gulf Coast, 991 F.2d at 245.
386. Id. at 251.
387. Id. at 250; see 41 U.S.C. §§ 701-707 (1988).
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determining the merits of the grievance de novo because:
Although the public policy exception to our usual deference is not
to be invoked lightly, a court may exercise its judicial power to
abrogate a private agreement when, for example, it gives short shrift
to the public's important yet unrepresented interests. When such violations are alleged, we enjoy more latitude in reviewing the
arbitrator's decision. As the Supreme Court held in W.R. Grace, the
question of public policy is wholly independent from the collective
bargaining agreement and "is ultimately one for resolution by the
courts." In such instances, reviewing courts resolve the issue by
"taking the facts 'as3 found by the arbitrator, but reviewing his conclusions de novo. 8
The court further concluded that the grievant's reinstatement was not
mandated by the ADA, because "[w]hile broadening employment
opportunities for millions of disabled workers, the ADA affirmatively
3 9
excludes from protection persons who are using drugs.""
Thus the
grievant - a current illegal drug abuser - was not a member of a
protected class under the ADA, the reinstatement award was set aside,
and Exxon's decision to terminate the grievant was allowed to
stand.3' 9
This decision, however, does not adequately address the concern
that the arbitration forum is not a proper one to adjust civil rights
violations. Although some courts have embraced this public policy
exception, it has not been adopted on a uniform basis. Without universal recognition of this concept, a grievant would still be at the
mercy of arbitrators whose decisions are subject to confirmation, despite the fact that they may have misapplied or erroneously applied
legal concepts. This is entirely unacceptable where important civil
rights are concerned. Additionally, plenary law suits must be available
after grievance arbitration because, under the 1991 amendments, civil
rights statutes now grant the right to jury trial and permit remedies
such as compensatory and punitive damages, as well as attorneys fees
which are not usually available in the arbitration context.3 91
In the final analysis, the traditional approach appears to be most
capable of protecting rights created by federal statutes such as the

388.
389.
390.
391.

Gulf Coast, 991 F.2d at 249 (citations omitted).
Id. at 251.
Id. at 257 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12114 (Supp. V 1993)).
See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (current version

at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1988 (Supp. V 1993)).
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ADA. With this approach, even if a grievant's claim is denied after
arbitration, he or she will still have access to federal court. The grievant may then utilize the federal court's disclosure and evidentiary
rules to prove the existence of an ADA claim which may not have
been apparent in the less formal arbitral context. Consequently, the
best suited role for an arbitrator appears to be the traditional one, that
of an interpreter of the contractual rights engendered in collective
bargaining agreements.
PART V
CONCLUSION

This paper's primary goal has been to examine three areas in
which Title I of the ADA has come into conflict with federal labor
statutes and common law precepts. From an examination of these
conflicts it is relatively easy to conclude that the ADA's primary
objective is not inconsistent with the national labor policy reflected in
ERISA and the Taft-Hartley Act. Reconciliation of these statutes with
the ADA will not take a Herculean effort.
As demonstrated in Part II, the resolution of the conflict between
the ADA and the Taft-Hartley Act can be effectively accomplished by
the parties to a collective bargaining agreement while they are engaging in negotiations over the terms of a new agreement. It is at this
time that they have the ability to implement agreement provisions
which would require additional negotiation over possible reasonable
accommodations when they are ultimately confronted with the special
concerns of handicapped employees.
While resolution of the conflict between the ADA and the TaftHartley Act is yet to be seen, the NLRB and the EEOC have jointly
promulgated a memorandum of understanding between their respective
general counsel which provides for coordination when either addresses
charges which implicate issues germane to both the ADA and the
Taft-Hartley Act.3" This memorandum requires coordinated deferral
between the NLRB and EEOC if charges are filed at either administrative body which implicate possible violations of both the TaftHartley Act and the ADA. 3

392. See NLRB, EEOC Memo of Understanding on Procedure for Coordinating ADA,
NLRA, 1 EMPL. DISCRMINATON REP. 156 (Dec. 1, 1993).
393. Id.
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This mutual understanding between the EEOC and the NLRB
will do much to promote and harmonize the important concerns involved in both the ADA and the Taft-Hartley Act. The counsel's
office of both the NLRB and the EEOC have advised this author that
since the memorandum's issuance, there have been to date less than a
dozen occasions when Board charges have implicated the ADA. This
may be prima facie evidence that conflicts between the ADA and the
Taft-Hartley Act are being resolved by good faith negotiation between
the parties before charges are filed; negotiation which might be the
product of a collective bargaining agreement's reasonable accommodation provision.
As discussed in Part III of this article, the tension between the
ADA and ERISA is currently awaiting judicial resolution. However,
even if Donaghey ultimately holds that the Mason Tenders Welfare
Fund's elimination of welfare benefits was in fact a subterfuge with
its ultimate purpose being the evasion of ADA Title I, it would not
mean that receipt of welfare benefits would automatically become an
employee's vested right. Under ERISA, which remains unaffected by
the ADA, welfare benefits may still be causally terminated. Furthermore, an employer may modify its welfare plan to place a benefit cap
on all high-cost medical conditions so that no one infirmity, such as
AIDS, HIV infection or cancer, is singled out. In this situation no
single group could protest that the modification is discriminatory. As
long as an employer can prove that it has a sound actuarial basis for
a plan modification, and that no subterfuge was intended, the ADA
will not prohibit that employer's action.
Ultimately, if employees desire that their medical benefits become a vested entitlement, a vesting provision should be negotiated
(or a legislative amendment to ERISA adopted). Additionally, the
ADA should be amended so that the concept of subterfuge is made
more definite. Such an amendment might provide that a plan modification will be presumed to be a subterfuge if the total cost of coverage for the excluded medical condition is less than that of other
illnesses which are actually covered by the plan. In such an instance,
it should be assumed that the only motive for the exclusion is a discriminatory one.
However, even an ERISA vesting provision will not eliminate
the concern of employees that they be provided with adequate health
insurance. Vesting would only occur if benefits were actually provided by their employer. As we have seen, there is no requirement in
ERISA mandating that welfare benefits be part of an employee's
compensation. In the final analysis, only a national health insurance
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plan can guarantee that medical insurance is accessible to all who
require it.
Finally, as explained in Part IV of this article, arbitration of
ADA claims is not contrary to the goals of the statute so long as the
grievant is allowed to commence a subsequent plenary action. This
prospect seems quite likely, since the Supreme Court's holding in
Gardner-Denver will apparently be applicable in the ADA context.
Furthermore, as long as the arbitration mechanism covering ADA
disputes is established through a collective bargaining agreement,
there would be no waiver of an employee's statutory rights to bring
an action under the ADA.
Hopefully, this article has provided the reader with greater insight into the ADA's goals, as well as indicated ways in which that
statute's terms can be reconciled with the problematic areas adumbrated. If it has, it will have served a larger purpose, one which
motivated Congress' decision to actually enact the ADA: the eradication of employment discrimination against handicapped individuals.
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